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1. Institution of university and economics 
 
Economists think of themselves as scientists, 
but <…> they are more like theologians. The 
closest predecessors for the current members of 
the economics profession are not scientists 
such as Albert Einstein or Isaac Newton; 
rather, we economists are more truly the heirs 
of Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther.  
        (Robert H. Nelson, 2001, p. XV) 
 
 
 Institutions of economics appeared in Germany, England and the United States in the 
second half of the 19
th
 century. They were born inside national institutions of university. That 
is why I begin my analysis from the 13
th
 century when the institution of university was 
created. It makes a difference with the “birth” of the institution of science in the 17th century 
which took place outside the university. This “birth” can be linked with foundation in 1660 of 
the Royal Society of London for the Improvement of Natural Knowledge. During several 
centuries university was a purely educational establishment subordinated to Church and state 
having the task of forming clergymen and civil servants. First universities were associations of 
teachers and/or students, having their own status which determined rules of teaching and 
learning. Main basic subjects taught were Latin language, rhetoric, logic, mathematics 
(arithmetic and geometry), astronomy, music and the central discipline was theology. Two 
applied subjects were also taught: law and medicine. The creation of these universities was 
linked not only with general progress of the West (economic renewal, urban growth and 
development of exchanges). It was linked with the need of Catholic Church, civil authorities 
and ruling classes in educated people for managing their affairs (Charle and Verger, 2007, p. 
8-13). In spite of the fact that first universities were associations, they were strongly 
dependent upon civil authorities, i.e. the King, but the support of the Pope was really decisive 
and very soon, universities were practically subordinated to the Church (Ibid, p.15).  
 During the 14
th
 and 15
th
 centuries, while being officially clerical institutions, 
universities turned more and more under the control of cities and states, which expected from 
them forming knowledgeable people and competent lawyers that they needed for their 
developing administrations. These people were also expected to elaborate national and 
monarchic ideology which accompanied the creation of Modern State. The loss of initial 
autonomy of universities was compensated by various advantages, including wages for 
professors paid by the state and promises of good careers.  In exchange of the favours of the 
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Prince, universities were compelled to provide an orthodox education, to form future local 
elites and to contribute to the established social and political order (Ibid, p. 19). The 
disciplines taught were the same as before. The absence of experimentation by students in 
classes limited teaching of exact sciences to the old framework fixed by Aristotle and Ptolemy 
(Ibid, p. 33). Teaching of medicine was based on Roman sources. The emphasis in the 
teaching of law was made on canonical law. Teaching of Aristotle was not autonomous, but 
considered as a preparation to the learning of theology, which contained the study and 
interpretation of the Bible. At this time, theology was under the influence of Aristotle (Ibid, p. 
26-27). Educational methods in all disciplines were scholastic. It was necessary to learn some 
limited numbers of texts which were considered to contain all knowledge or at least general 
principles on the basis of which all knowledge had to be based. Two kinds of methods were 
used: lectio and disputatio. The former consisted in reading aloud texts by professors or 
advanced students. The latter represented discussions between students under the leadership 
of a professor. These discussions had to be based on syllogisms making constant quotations of 
authoritative texts (Ibid, p.29). From the 16
th 
century, the autonomy of universities 
disappeared, including elections of administrators. Rules of student admissions, syllabuses 
and exams were determined by the state. Religious loyalty of a student was checked by his 
solemn promise before admission (Ibid, p. 39). Up to the 18
th
 century, universities continued 
to provide exclusively an obsolete education in all domains based on ancient Greeks and 
Romans, as well as on the Bible and theological texts. “The real education was obtained 
outside the university, either through family education, salon conversations, personal 
readings, or by practice itself at the beginning of a career. The university degree was first of 
all evaluated as a certificate of social belonging, a sign of allegiance to the established 
political order” (Ibid, p. 56). New knowledge was created outside the university.   
 The link between scientific research and university was first created in Germany at the 
beginning of the 19
th
 century with the reform of Wilhelm Humboldt started in 1810 in the 
newly created University of Berlin. Johann G. Fichte participated actively in the creation of 
this university. He considered the vocation of the scholar in the following way: “To me, [to 
the Scholar], is entrusted the culture of my own and following ages; from my labours will 
proceed the course of future generations, the history of nations who are yet to be. To this am I 
called, to bear witness to the Truth: my life, my fortunes are of little moment; the results of 
my life are of infinite moment. I am a Priest of Truth; I am in her pay; I have bound myself to 
do all things, to venture all things, to suffer all things for her. If I should be persecuted and 
hated for her sake, if I should even meet death in her service, what wonderful thing is it I shall 
have done? what but that which I clearly ought to do?” (Fichte, 1851, pp. 59 - 60).  German 
institution of university of Humboldt and Fichte has abandoned many features of medieval 
European university. University of Berlin became the first so called research university, i.e. 
research and educational establishment at the same time. University professors were allowed 
and even obliged to do their research inside the universities. The concept of Humboldt 
considered science not as something accomplished that teachers should transfer to students, 
but as “a problem which has not yet been solved” and for its solution the research should 
never be stopped. According to him “the university teacher is therefore no longer a teacher 
and the student no longer someone merely engaged in the learning process but a person who 
undertakes his own research, while the professor directs his research and supports him in it” 
(Humboldt, XIII, p. 261). Humboldt believed in the necessity of academic freedom but 
thought that appointments of university professors have to be made exclusively by the state 
because its interests are very strongly linked with them. Humboldt also admitted the 
usefulness of existence of frictions between professors on scientific questions. It is 
worthwhile to note that the vice-rector of the University of Berlin at the time of reform was 
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Friedrich Schleiermacher, the founder of hermeneutics as a general methodology of 
interpretation (Schleiermacher, 1998). This fact certainly helped later in German research 
universities to find a right version of functional analogy of natural scientific experiments for 
empirical research in social sciences in general and in particular in economics. I mean so 
called interpretive paradigm. Deep roots of Historism in German culture without doubt also 
helped finding this right version.  
 National professional societies/associations of economists began to appear at the end 
of the 19
th
 century. In Germany, it took place in 1873 (Verein für Sozialpolitik), in the USA – 
in 1885 (American Economic Association) and in England – in 1890 (The British Economic 
Association, later renamed The Royal Economic Society). As the previously mentioned Royal 
Society of London for the Improvement of Natural Knowledge, these societies/associations of 
economists were voluntary associations, but unlike the former, their members were not just 
those for whom research was a passion without any link with their teaching activity, but 
university professors of economics. As a matter of fact, national communities of academic 
economists appeared as communities of teachers of this discipline in the universities of their 
countries. In this way, economics as an institution from the very beginning was attached to the 
institution of university. In the second half of the 19
th
 century British and American 
universities were still very different from German ones. Curriculum of English and most of 
the American universities were dominated by classics and mathematics, and theology still 
occupied an important place. Unlike German universities, British and American universities 
of that time were very little influenced by the institution of science embodied in Royal Society 
of London for the Improvement of Natural Knowledge. To my mind it was one of the 
determinant factors of institutionalisation of economics in these countries as abstract 
discipline with its a priori method. On the contrary, German economics was institutionalised 
in new research universities, in which experimental approach was highly valued.  
 The English and German approaches were confronted in the United States. In the first 
half of the 19
th
 century American universities were British-like: “By and large, the purpose of 
higher education in pre-Civil War America was to teach piety and discipline. The vast 
majority of faculty were involved in preaching and missionary work <…> The first American 
textbooks were written by clergymen, and a religious understanding of economic activity was 
pervasive. Capitalism and the laws of political economy were thought to be in harmony with 
the laws of god and consistent with the higher purpose of moral elevation” (Fourcade, 2009, 
p. 64). In Britain in the middle of the century John Stuart Mill, being as his father agnostic, 
transferred the legitimacy of political economy from religion to science.  He took geometry as 
a model and characterised political economy as essentially an abstract science and its method 
as a priori method. According to him “it reasons and must necessary reason from 
assumptions, not from facts” (Mill, 1994, p. 56). On the basis of this methodology Marshall 
developed his economics as a “scientific” legitimacy of the established social order1. This 
type of economics was welcome by American businessmen who at that time increasingly 
replaced clergymen on college and university boards of trustees: “University leaders 
(presidents and boards alike) often favoured [economics and other social sciences] as ‘secular 
substitutes for religion’ and saw in them a continuation of the old courses in moral 
philosophy” (Fourcade, 2009, p. 66).  
 German academic economists of the second half of the 19
th
 century followed natural 
sciences research tradition with their experimental method. They did affiliate neither Smithian 
nor Marxian economics which were based on Mill’s methodology with its a priori method.  
Both the scope and method of German economics were different from economics of Smith 
and Marx. In the scope of their analysis there was not only quantitative variables such as 
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production, consumption, labour, values, prices and capital, but first of all qualitative entities: 
institutions and linked with them beliefs. They have found for social sciences, including 
economics, a functional analogue to experimental research in natural sciences what is called 
now qualitative research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005) which includes monographic research. 
Monographic studies were in the centre of research of German economists. According to 
Bruno Latour, the specificity of scientific research does not consist in a special “scientific 
method”, but in the design of experimental situation, in which the object has the possibility to 
resist, “to object” to the ideas of the researcher concerning it. Part of the experimental 
situation is a recording device assuring descriptions, the core of the experimental work. 
Latour contests conclusions of ‘scientific methodologies’ in social sciences which ignore the 
most important feature of scientific research: “Unfortunately, although it tastes and smells like 
hard science, those all-terrain 'scientific methodologies' are a sham and a cheap imitation for a 
reason that becomes clear if we go back to the definition of objectivity, as what allows one 
entity to object to what is said about it. If we lose the influence of the object in what is said 
about it, as quantitavists are so proud of saying, we also lose objectivity!” (Latour, 2000). It is 
this property of scientific research which is responsible for such a huge influence of science-
based technologies on humanity. Monographic research fulfills in social science the role of 
recording device. It is the contents of monographic descriptions of objects of research which 
can resist to the ideas of the researcher concerning this object. The result of this resistance is 
an understanding of the object or phenomena under study.  
 The name of German school of economics “historical” is misleading. They understood 
the economic history in the same way as Schumpeter did later; it includes present-day facts 
(Schumpeter, 1954, p. 12). Its distinguished feature was monographic research whether it 
concerned the past or the present. Nevertheless, “nobody can hope understand the economic 
phenomena of any, including the present, epoch who has not an adequate command of 
historical facts and an adequate amount of historical sense or of what may be described as 
historical experience” (Ibid.., pp. 12-13). American institutionalism has appeared at the turn 
of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries under the direct influence of German economics. Walton H. 
Hamilton, the author of the term “institutional economics”, characterised the historical 
method of analysis in the following way: “It goes to the past only with the end in view and so 
far as is necessary to explain what a thing is in terms of how it came to be” (Hamilton, 1919). 
The absolute necessity to use this method in socio-economic research comes from the sources 
of social regularities which are rules (institutions), and linked with them, beliefs. These rules 
and beliefs often remain unchanged during long period of time. This historical (genetic) 
research can not be made on the basis of Mill’s methodology (“reason from assumptions, not 
from facts”).  Being a very gifted mathematician, Marshall, on the basis of this methodology, 
has started the process of graduate institutional transformation of economics into a 
mathematical science by the introduction of the Mathematical Tripos examinations in 
Cambridge University. These examinations served as a test for all who wished to study 
economics at Cambridge. This move was supported by such beliefs as “mathematics is the 
queen of sciences” and “real science needs quantifications”. History of natural sciences shows 
that these beliefs are wrong. According to Latour “the imitation of the natural sciences by the 
social sciences has so far been a comedy of errors”. He thinks that “believing what 
philosophers of science and some scientists were saying about 'the scientific method', social 
scientists have been paralysed by a 'physics envy'”(Latour, 2000). Economists were paralysed 
more than anybody else.  
 Anglo-Saxon institution of economics created in the framework of universities, very 
much touched by their medieval history and subordinated to the new capitalist establishment, 
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laid this discipline to the incarnation of the ideology favouring interests of this establishment
2
. 
Contemporary mainstream economics continues to fulfil the same function: “The social 
understanding we gain from modern economics is disappointing, even impoverishing <…>  
In the face of such limitations, why does economics enjoy such prestige? The awkward 
possibility arises that the reason is precisely because its modern form is ahistoric, apolitical, 
asocial. Olympian views have appeal to all social orders, and a view that eschews politics and 
sociology may have special appeal for a social order that celebrates its close relation to 
science. The nature of the appeal itself is a function of economics we have heretofore left 
unexamined. This is its service as ideology - not a narrow, consciously self-serving apologia, 
but a belief system of the kind that accompanies and supports all social orders. The purpose of 
such belief systems is to provide the moral certitude that is the precondition for political and 
social peace of mind, as much or more for the dominant elements in any social order as for its 
subordinate elements. No doubt this peace of mind is always tinged with doubt or tainted with 
hypocrisy, but in the end, social orders at all levels of hierarchy require some body of 
knowledge and set of beliefs to which to repair. Primitive societies have their myths and 
interpretations of nature, command societies their sacred texts. By no means exclusively, but 
also by no means in trivial fashion, economics serves that purpose for capitalism as a social 
order” (Heilbroner, 2004, pp. 629-630).   
 
 
2. Institution of science and economics 
 
I want to propose that we see scientific method 
as a heavily textured phenomenon rather than 
as the mere execution of some philosophically 
intuited standard of reason <…> To pursue 
such a goal one must move inside the 
epistemic space within which scientists work 
and identify the tools and devices which they 
use in their “truth”-finding navigation. Not 
surprisingly, what we find there is not the clear 
and austere progress of verifications (or 
falsifications, or explanatory capacities) we 
might expect, but the “untidy” goings-on of 
various businesses of experimentation.  
  (Karin Knorr Cetina, 1991, p. 107) 
 
 
 According to historians of science the first scientists were Galileo Galilei (1564 – 
1642) and William Gilbert (1544 – 1603) (Gribbin, 2003, p. 68). Both of these scientists made 
their research outside of universities where they taught and their teaching activities had 
practically nothing in common with their research activities. Their beliefs and practices 
influenced substantially rules which members of scientific communities continue to follow up 
to the present. Both used actively experimental method, which includes specially organised 
observation, for example on the basis of a constructed telescope. Galileo was convinced that 
the universe is a book which is written in the mathematical language, and the symbols of this 
language are geometrical figures like triangles and circles. Without help of these symbols “it 
is impossible to comprehend a single word of it [the book of the universe]; without of which 
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one wanders in vain through a dark labyrinth” (Burtt, 2003, p. 75).  He strongly believed in 
the force of mathematical models which once constructed can be used to understand the 
reality. This belief had a religious basis: “God has made the world an immutable 
mathematical system, permitting by the mathematical method an absolute certainty of 
scientific knowledge” (Ibid., p. 82). Gilbert, who apparently did not shared this belief, was the 
father of nonmathematical scientific current (Ibid., p. 163). Another scientist who 
tremendously contributed to the formation of rules of scientific research was Robert Boyle. 
Following Gilbert practice he championed the method of reasoned analysis of sensible facts, 
confirmed by exact experiment: “Experience is but an assistant to reason, since it doth indeed 
supply informations to the understanding but the understanding still remain the judge, and has 
the power or right to examine and make use of the testimonies that are presented to it” (Ibid., 
p. 170 – 171). Boyle was one of the organisers of the Royal Society of London for the 
Improvement of Natural Knowledge known as Royal Society
3
.  It is his vision of scientific 
research which was institutionalised in the framework of associations of its practitioners, one 
of the first of which was the above mentioned Royal Society. 
The Royal Society was founded in 1660 by members of one or two either secretive or 
informal societies already in existence. The origins of the Royal Society lie in an "invisible 
college" of natural philosophers who began meeting in the mid-1640s to discuss the ideas of 
Francis Bacon. The Royal Society enjoyed the confidence and official support of the  
monarchy. The "New" or "Experimental" form of philosophy was generally ill-regarded by 
the Aristotelian (and religious) academies. The motto of the Royal Society, "Nullius in Verba" 
("Nothing in words") or in other words "Demonstration by facts and not by words", signifies 
the Society's commitment to establishing the truth of scientific matters through experiment 
rather than through citation of authority and logical reasoning. The philosophical basis of the 
Royal Society differed from previous philosophies such as Scholasticism, which established 
scientific truth based on deductive logic, concordance with divine providence and the citation 
of such ancient authorities as Aristotle. The Society was to meet weekly to witness 
experiments and discuss what we would now call scientific topics. The history of science 
since 1660 is closely intertwined with the story of the Royal Society. Approximately at the 
same time similar societies were created in Italy (Florentine Accademia de Cimento in 1657) 
and France (Parisian Académie Royale des Sciences in 1666). These societies “represented 
alternative organisational forms to the universities <…> The new societies aimed to provide a 
novel organisational form uniquely suited to the new practice; they made the production of 
the new knowledge, rather than the just guardianship of and commentary on the old, central to 
their identity; and they aimed, with varying success, to link the progress of science to civic 
concerns rather than wholly scholarly or religious ones” (Shapin, 1996, p. 133). The societies 
“placed high value on the necessity of disciplined collective labour in the making of proper 
natural knowledge” (Ibid.) and “manifested a pronounced concern for orderliness and the 
rules of proper behaviour in making and evaluating natural knowledge” (Ibid.). The Royal 
Society was dominated by scholars-gentlemen. They considered “veracity to be underwritten 
by virtue. Gentlemen insisted upon the truthfulness of their relations as a mark of their 
condition and their honour. The acknowledgement of gentlemanly truthfulness was the 
acknowledgment of gentlemanly identity” (Shapin, 1994, p. 410). Objectivity of truth seeking 
by gentlemen in the process of evaluating testimony of experiments and scientific debate 
concerning them was favoured by gentlemen’ material independence: “Free action and 
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integrity were seen as the condition for truth-telling, while constraint and need were 
recognised as the grounds of mendacity” (Ibid.).  
              Isaac Newton made all his research not as a university professor but as a member of 
the Royal Society. He was Its president from 1703 to 1727.  Contrary to the opinion of 
Galileo, Newton estimated that there is a distinct difference between mathematical truths and 
physical truths. He thought that the world is what it is. It is well and good if it is possible to 
discover some exact mathematical laws, but “so far as not, we must seek to expand our 
mathematics or resign ourselves to some other less certain method” (Burtt, 2003, p. 212). 
During all his life he attacked the idea of “hypotheses”. It is necessary to underline that 
Newton was convinced of the “superiority of the way of experiments to the method of 
deduction from a priori assumptions”. His statement concerning it is well known: “I do not 
think it needed to explicate my doctrine by any hypothesis at all” (Ibid., p. 215 - 217). The 
famous Newton’s experimental-mathematical method can be presented as a sequence of the 
three following steps: “First, the simplification of phenomena by experiments, so that those 
characteristics of them that vary quantitatively, together with the mode of their variation, may 
be seized and precisely defined <…> Second, the mathematical elaboration of such 
propositions, usually by the aid of the calculus, in such a way as will express mathematically 
the operation of these principles in whatever quantities or relations they might be found. 
Third, further exact experiments must be made (1) to verify the applicability of these 
deductions in any new field and to reduce them to their most general form; (2) in the case of 
more complex phenomena, to detect the presence and determine the value of any additional 
causes (in mechanics, forces) which can then themselves be subjected to quantitative 
treatment; and (3) to suggest, in cases where the nature of such additional causes remains 
obscure, an expansion of our present mathematical apparatus so as to handle them more 
objectively.” (Ibid., pp. 221 – 222).  
            We can see here that Newton envisages using experiments at the beginning and at the 
end of the research process. Werner Heisenberg (2006), one of the authors of quantum 
mechanics, describes the research process in a similar way. This feature of the Newtonian 
method is often distorted by methodologists of science, by presenting so called scientific 
method as hypothetic-deductive. Newtonian simplification of the phenomena under study 
occurs not by simplified a priori modelling but a simplification of phenomena by experiments. 
In this way a contact with reality remains in spite of the simplifications and it is not the case 
in Anglo-Saxon economics based on Mill’s methodology. Of course the Newtonian method as 
it is can be applied only to relatively simple phenomena.  It is not the case with socio-
economic-political phenomenon. German historical school (Schmoller) and American 
institutionalism (Commons) preserving the spirit of the Newtonian method in their research 
practices adapted it to complex realities which they investigated. 
As it is well known, histories are always written by winners. The winner in “the 
struggle over the soul of economics, institutionalist and neoclassical economists in America 
between the wars” (Yonay, 1998), were the latter and during several decades they produced 
absolutely distorting discourses concerning the German historical school and American 
institutionalism. Among multiple negative labels are non-scientific, atheoretical, inductive, 
unproductive, useless, normative. I will discuss these labels in following sections of this 
paper, but here I want to say something about the last one. Economists produce texts. These 
texts can be of two types. The first type of texts concerns studies of "what is", that is of 
existing economic objects and phenomena, and the second represents reasoning about "what 
ought to be" in economic matters. If our understanding of science corresponds to the tradition 
created by the Royal Society of London for the Improvement of Natural Knowledge, then we 
cannot consider the latter type of texts as scientific. Nevertheless, the science practiced and 
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preached by this Royal Society has never been value-free. Without any doubt they studied 
“what is” but such its prominent members as Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton were devout 
Christians and enthusiastic students of the Bible. Both of them wrote not only scientific but 
also theological texts. Their faith influences their research activity in the sense that it created 
for it very high motivation: to discover the design of the Creator. I contrast to texts of 
political, social or moral philosophers like Thomas Hobbes
4
, Boyle and Newton did not 
reflect in their scientific writings "what ought to be" but only "what is".  
 The German Gustav Schmoller and American John Commons had the same attitude to 
their research. They shared Christian values, and it motivated and directed their research 
work. They studied "what is", and on the basis of it, they expressed "what ought to be" as 
outcome of their studies and not its essence. The outcome finally was embodied in advanced 
social legislation of their countries. Their values did determine domains of studies but not 
their contents and understanding they got from them. Their merit as social researchers was 
connected with the fact that good legislation ("what ought to be") cannot be made without 
good understanding of social reality ("what is"). In other words, in order to change rules 
(introduce new rules), it is vital to understand the functioning of acting rules. Interpretation of 
investigated institutions (rules) as good or bad, just or unjust, could follow the research work, 
but their activity as researchers was concentrated on the understanding of how these 
institutions functioned. The results of investigations (understanding of functioning of 
institutions), moral and political evaluation of findings and proposal for institutional change 
can coexist in one text (book or article), but it just means that the author changes hats when 
she/he moves from studying "what is" to proposing "what ought to be". In Schmoller’s and 
Commons’ writings the former did influence the latter but not vice versa. On the contrary, 
Smith, Marx and Marshall, as well as their contemporary followers, incorporated their beliefs 
concerning the capitalist social order directly in their theories. In this way their theories are 
first of all scientifically looked holders of ideologies.  
 Science can be considered as a social organism. The Royal Society at the beginning of 
its activity was a very small social organism. Now science is a huge global social organism 
with its formal and informal rules of recruitment, promotion, publication etc. These rules are 
an evolutionary result of ideological, political and financial influences from outside and inside 
of scientific communities and of beliefs shared by members of these communities. It is quite 
easy to understand, and we will expand this understanding passing from one section to 
another of this paper, why in the case of economics these rules lead the communities of 
economists to theological character of their discipline. It is important to understand why, in 
spite of all these influences, natural sciences continue to bring to the mankind means to 
dominate the nature and influence in a spectacular way its material environment. Already 
Charles Peirce saw the research as a collective action of investigators. He had remarked a 
seemingly magic capacity of scientific communities by observing and by analysing something 
separately, gradually to converge on the results of investigation: “Different minds may set out 
with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a force 
outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we 
are carried, not where we wish, but to a fore-ordained goal, is like the operation of destiny. No 
modification of the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no natural bent 
of mind even, can enable a man to escape the predestinate opinion. This great hope is 
embodied in the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately 
agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in 
this opinion is the real.” (Peirce, 1878, pp. 138 -139) The cause of this convergence is the 
same type of “resistance” of objects of study to different investigators. "Nothing in words" as 
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one of the main values and methodological principles of natural scientific communities 
reinforce the consideration of character of this “resistance” as the main argument in the 
discourse inside of scientific communities. As long as communities of economists share 
neither this value nor this methodological principle, economics will remain primarily secular 
theologies.   
 Charles Peirce also gives us the key for understanding the functioning of institution 
maintaining a theological type of thought: “Let an institution be created which shall have for 
its object to keep correct doctrines before the attention of the people, to reiterate them 
perpetually, and to teach them to the young; having at the same time power to prevent 
contrary doctrines from being taught, advocated, or expressed. Let all possible causes of a 
change of mind be removed from men's apprehensions. Let them be kept ignorant, lest they 
should learn of some reason to think otherwise than they do. Let their passions be enlisted, so 
that they may regard private and unusual opinions with hatred and horror. Then, let all men 
who reject the established belief be terrified into silence.” (Peirce, 1877, p. 117) It is exactly 
what Alfred Marshall has initiated as the institution of economics in England at the end of the 
19
th
 century and what later expanded throughout the world. William Cunningham, an English 
advocate of German-type economics, provides the following testimony of the situation in the 
community of economists in England of that time: “Anyone who has refused to follow the 
economic fashion of recent years in England must have been greatly hampered in his efforts 
to pursue his own studies or guide those of others; boards of studies would exercise a galling 
control, and editors and publishers would view his writing with suspicion <…> There was no 
need for the English adherents of the realistic school of economists to complain when 
obstacles were placed in the way of their work, and avenues of publication were closed 
against them.” (Cunningham, 1894, p. 327). In this paper, published in the USA, he discussed 
the attitude of Professor Marshall and disciples towards the German-type economics: “In 
Germany <…> a veritable revolution has taken place in economic studies during the last fifty 
years <…> a revolution in the whole conception and character of economic studies: it has 
come to be concerned with the observation and study of the actual economic conditions of 
society in the past and in the present; not merely with the formulating of hypothetical 
principles, which the sciolist was only too apt to convert into ready made receipts for 
removing any of the ills of social life.  It is not a little remarkable that while this revolution 
has taken place in Germany and to some extent in America, England should have been almost 
untouched by it” (Ibid., pp. 317 – 318). He also criticised the Mill’s methodology on which 
Marshallian economics was based: “The Germans began to devote themselves to the past, and 
thus opened up a field for discriminating observation and accumulation of facts. Mill took no 
pains about the past, and comparatively little with the details of contemporary experience. His 
eyes were fixed on the time to come <…> So far as its matter is concerned, the work did not 
stimulate to observation and research. Nor did the character of the science as treated by Mill 
undergo any decided change: he regards it as a hypothetical science” (Ibid., p. 319). At 
present communities of academic economists continue to follow the Millian methodology.   
 Upper quoted Bruno Latour has come to his characteristic of a scientific research, as 
an investigation dealt with resistance of the object under study to the researcher, on the basis 
of the research as an anthropologist using participant-observer methods in the study of the 
functioning of the Laboratory for Neuroendocrinology at the Jonas Salk Institute for 
Biological Studies in La Jolla, California. Begining in October 1975 for nearly two years he 
carried out a kind of ethnographic study of scientific research in this laboratory. In his study 
he closely followed the intimate processes of scientific work, i.e. every detail of what the 
scientists do and how and what they think (Latour and Woolgar, 1979, p. 12). In 1977 Roger 
Guillemin, the head of said laboratory, had received the Nobel Prize in Physiology or 
Medicine. It meant that what Latour studied was highly professional. The institution of Nobel 
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Prize has become an important part of the global institution of science. As it is well known, 
every year since 1901 the Nobel Prize is awarded for achievements in physics, chemistry, 
physiology or medicine, literature and for peace. I think that the three scientific disciplines 
were chosen by Alfred Nobel not by chance; they continued tradition lunched by the Royal 
Society. In his testament he expressed the will that prizes would be awarded “to those who, 
during the preceding year, shall have conferred the greatest benefit on mankind”. Among the 
five indicated domains there was no mathematics nor philosophy or social sciences. In 1968, 
Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden) established The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in 
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, i.e. this prize is not really the Nobel Prize, 
but the prize of a bank. This prize is addressed to a community involved in absolutely 
incompatible with physics, chemistry, physiology practices, and whose “benefit on mankind” 
is rather questionable. Let us hope that one day this prize will deserve to be confused with the 
Nobel Prize.  
 Bruno Latour was not the only one to investigate activities of researchers in natural 
sciences. The world of high energy physics was studied by Sharon Traweek (1988). A 
comparative investigation of activities of researchers in the domains of high energy physics 
and molecular biology has been made by Karin Knorr Cetina (1991, 1999). The latter comes 
to the same conclusions as Latour concerning ‘the resistance’: “Molecular geneticists do 
interact with ‘the world’ – as it is featured in the laboratory of course, but this featuring does 
not preclude but rather enhances resistance. They constitute part of a behavioral system in 
which ‘things’ are not passive receivers but active reactants” (Knor Cetina, 1991, pp. 119 – 
120). At present most of the economists consider economics as theory or theories. To do 
economics mean for them to develop or to apply theories. According to Knorr Cetina “much 
of laboratory science in molecular genetics neither directly draws upon, nor it seems terribly 
involved with establishing, theoretical representations. In molecular genetics, theoretical 
statements may indeed be post hoc ‘representations’ of materials <…>” (Ibid., p. 120). 
Apparently neither Latour nor Knor Cetina would agree with Milton Friedman’s famous 
statement: “A theory is the way we perceive ‘facts’, and we cannot perceive ‘facts’ without a 
theory” (Friedman, 1953, p. 34). Some sincere mainstream economists do not agree with 
Friedman either: “By regularities I mean phenomena that appear repeatedly in similar 
environments at different points in time and at different locations. I have the impression that 
as economic theorists, we hope that regularities will miraculously emerge from the formulas 
we write leisurely at our desks. Applied economists often feel the need for a model before 
they mine data for a pattern or regularity. Do we really need economic theory to find these 
regularities? Would it not be better to go in the opposite direction by observing the real world, 
whether through empirical or experimental data, to find unexpected regularities? Personally I 
doubt that we need pre conceived theories to find regularities.” (Rubinstein, 2006, p. 873) 
Finally what we learn from Knorr Cetina’ investigation, it is the challenge to the accepted 
view of a unified science even in the framework of natural sciences. Research procedures can 
sharply differ in different disciplines, but if they represent interacting with the “resisting” 
entities under study, they certainly can be classified as scientific research. 
 Born as a political/moral philosophy, British political economy has been presented by 
J.S. Mill as a science on the basis of its wrong discourse about science (1836) later developed 
in his “System of Logic” (1843).  The marginalist revolution of Walras, Jevons and Menger 
followed Mill by accepting a priori method as their method. With the start in Great Britain at 
the end of the 19
th
 century of the profession of economics as a profession of university teacher 
of this discipline, Marshall guided the process of institutionalisation of economics on the basis 
of marginalism and Mill’s methodology. He initialised in 1890 the creation of the British 
Economic Association (The Royal Economic Society), in order to strengthen the British 
institution of economics of which he was the designer. Formally it could look like the Royal 
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Society initiated by Boyle but  in reality it resembled much more a guild, i. e. an association 
of craftsmen in a particular trade
5
. Institutionalisation of economics in Germany, also on the 
basis of profession of university teachers of economics, took nevertheless a totally different 
path. German Verein für Sozialpolitik can be rightly considered as a functional analogue for 
economics of the Royal Society of London for the Improvement of Natural Knowledge.  
 
 
3. Institutionalisation of economics in Germany and historical institutionalism 
 
I felt that in the German universities there was 
room for growth and the development of 
individuality <…> It is that which makes 
studying in Germany such a pleasure to every 
real student. You learn here, and only here, 
how to do independent, real scientific work.   
        (Richard T. Ely, 1938, p. 43) 
 
 
 Founders of the Royal Society were convinced that the universe works in accordance 
with the laws of nature which God established for its order and control. One of the most 
influential of them, Robert Boyle, in his book (1690) explained that the study and dominion of 
nature is a duty given to man by God
6
. The first scientists were very much motivated in their 
research activity because they thought that they were discovering the design of the Creator 
and in this way they approach the humanity to God. Community of researchers of the Royal 
Society did not earn their living by their investigating activity. All of them had independent 
sources of existence which had no connection with their research work. Thus the Royal 
Society cannot be considered as a guild. A century later, Johann Fichte, the second after 
Humboldt founder of the institution of research university, saw the motivation the researcher 
in different way: “The true vocation of the scholar is the most widely extended survey of the 
actual advancement of the human race in general, and the steadfast promotion of that 
advancement.” (Fichte, 1851, p. 54). Institutionalisation of German economics happened in 
Humboldtian university and its architect, Gustav Schmoller, followed the ideas of Fichte. In 
this way Schmollerian Verein similar to the Royal Society had not been conceived as a guild. 
The foundation of the Verein took place quite quickly after the German unification. It is in 
1871 in Versailles that Germany's princes elected Prussia's King Wilhelm IV. The German 
Empire (Deutsches Reich) was established as a federation of states. Schmoller has taken for 
the community of German economists a more modest position than Fichte for scholars in 
general: most widely extended survey of the actual advancement of the young German nation, 
and the steadfast promotion of that advancement. United Germany needed national unity and 
the political crisis of early capitalism created danger for this unity. This danger came from the 
existence of the so-called “social question”.  
 Germany was behind Britain and France in industrialisation and urbanisation. 
Schmoller and his colleagues were very much impressed by the studies of Fridrich Engels 
over the British conditions (Engels, 2009) and of Lorenz von Stein over the French 
conditions. They considered these studies as indicators of what could happen in Germany in 
the future: “Engels’s vivid descriptions of the commercial vibrancy and man-made hell 
produced as a consequence of industrial development, chaotic urbanisation, the litany of 
abuses and deprivations inflicted on the working class and their resultant moral and ethical 
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degeneration, but also of the failure of charity, the ruthlessness of factory owners, and 
complacency of the British government in dealing with these problems caused a sensation in 
Germany” (Grimmer-Solem, 2003, p. 108 - 110). Lorenz von Stein came to the conclusion 
that “French society was driven with class-centred political conflict produced by increasing 
social inequality – a product of free market competition. Socialism and communism were thus 
simply an expression of justified proletarian aspirations to attain social equality”(Ibid., p.109). 
In his speech at the inaugural meeting of the Verein für Sozialpolitik Schmoller “warned of 
the threat from social revolution engendered by the division between employer and worker, 
propertied and propertyless classes, and suggested that popular economic beliefs concerning 
commercial freedom and economic individualism could well create even greater disorder, 
rather than the rosy future they imagined” (Tribe, 2002, p. 10) According to him “only the 
German state was in a position to reduce social tension and foster national unity, for it stood 
above selfish class interests, ‘legislating, guiding administration with a just hand, protecting 
the weak, raising the lower classes’” (Ibid.). Representatives of propertied classes denied the 
existence of the social question, but with national unification and formation of a national 
government new light had been shed on economic conditions: factory laws, factory 
inspection, corporative organizations, and courts of arbitration were all dismissed (Grimmer-
Solem, 2003, p. 178). “The new organisation [Verein für Sozialpolitik] was conceived as a 
body to exclusively research the social question to provide scientifically derived, general, and 
above all, practical information on reform to appeal to the parties of the political middle, the 
public, legislators, and government officials, it was hoped, would then use this ‘scientific’ 
information as a basis for policy decisions, and thereby not blinded by the fog of ‘partisan 
economics’” (Ibid., p.179).  
 Founders of the Verein shared their general frustration with the mode of reasoning of 
classical economics “that seemed wholly at odds with positivist and materialist scientific 
climate of the time, when the natural sciences were celebrating success upon success by 
working empirically” (Ibid., p.123). Unlike most of the university professors of economics, 
founders of Verein, Gustav Schmoller and Georg Knapp, received a good training in natural 
sciences: Schmoller had studied at the university in Tübingen chemistry, physics, mechanical 
engineering and technology; Knapp studied physics and chemistry in Liebig’s laboratory 
(Ibid., p. 133). The translation of Mill’s System of Logic into German has been published in 
1865, and like many others, Schmoller noticed the inconsistency of Mill’s treatment of social 
sciences by excluding application to them of experimental approach. “Rejecting these 
inconsistencies, which he saw as serving not science but Mill’s own opinion of what 
constituted human nature and natural law, Schmoller sought instead to approach economics as 
natural scientists did” (Ibid., p. 133 - 134). He believed that economic and social science had 
the same epistemology as natural sciences. According to Schmoller and his colleagues, major 
sources of social regularity were common morals, ethics, and institutions. Thus, to understand 
socio-economic phenomena it is necessary “to study all those institutions that had emerged 
over time to constrain and mould individual behaviour into purposive action and social 
interaction” (Ibid., p. 160). Their “search for moral commonality to construct new laws and 
institutions naturally led to historical investigations of those things that formed a common 
moral sphere and ethically constrained and moulded economic action: customs, norms, 
conventions, rules, regulations, laws, organisations, corporate bodies and other institutions, 
and not least, the state” (Ibid., p. 160 - 161). For Schmoller and his colleagues, “in economic 
analysis, morals and law could be viewed as causal factors”. Social reform for them was a 
process of piecemeal institutional adaptation (Ibid., p. 161). On the basis of his historical 
investigations Schmoller has come to the conclusion that “the state and its bureaucracy could 
defend the general interest and be forces for social improvement; institutions in the economy 
provided greater certainty and order to market relations and injected into these a set of moral-
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ethical norms” (Ibid., p. 168).  In this way institutions were “the means to create for a modern 
industrial economy a new moral-ethical order” (Ibid). 
 Thanks to the Verein in the community of German economists, good professional 
practice became identified with empirical research. It guided and organised economic 
research by its agenda-setting standing committees of annual conferences. These conferences 
were not just meetings of members of the profession sharing with each other results of their 
research. These conferences were places of debate of commissioned studies. “In advance of 
conferences,  Verein’s standing committee held meetings to nominate and vote on the subjects 
to be discussed at the conferences. Sets of questions were then raised and parameters set for 
research and fieldwork (or in the case of surveys, detailed questionnaires were drafted and 
sent out) by a commissioned expert, and increasingly, groups of experts. The results of these 
investigations and surveys would then be compiled into summary studies which were 
circulated before conferences <…> Following the conferences, commissioned studies were 
published in the Verein’s monograph series, the Schriften des Verein für Sozialpolitik <…> 
To get an idea of the scale of the Verein’s research, by 1914 it had published some 140 
volumes of its Schriften  of an average length of about 350 pages.”(Ibid., p. 69 -70). In many 
cases Verein received financial support from government departments for the collection of 
data (Tribe, 2002, p. 12). Results of investigations of German economists affiliated to Verein 
were published in several academic journals like Schmoller’s Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, 
Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich (Annal for Legislation, Administration, 
and Political Economy in the German Empire) and Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und 
Statistik (Annals for Political Economy and Statistics), chief editors of  which were Bruno 
Hildebrand and Johannes Conrad. 
 A very good description of the university part of the German institution of economics 
has been made by Keith Tribe: “In Germany those who might be considered “economists” 
would by the later nineteenth century have been principally defined by their employment as a 
teacher of economics in one of the several state universities. Chairs of economics had existed 
in Germany since the eighteenth century, and although the teaching delivered from these posts 
was transformed over time along with the subject, the posts themselves were a constant 
feature of the university landscape. This teaching was primarily for the benefit of students of 
law, attendance at a course of lectures in economics being a compulsory part of legal 
education. Those who studied economics for its own sake were thus by definition reading for 
doctorates, since there was no other qualification; but a doctorate was a formal requirement 
for university teaching, and also important for entry into some parts of state administration, 
especially the statistical offices established from the 1830s. When linked to the system of 
formal and informal contacts through which students entered employment, this added to the 
power and influence of Professors like Schmoller, able to assign doctoral topics to a growing 
band of students and draw upon public funds for the prosecution of pieces of research.” 
(Tribe, 2002, p. 4) Professors of economics in German universities were civil servants and 
decisions concerning their selection were made by the ministry of education. Nevertheless 
influential members of the Verein could influence this selection: “Gustav Schmoller, founder 
of the Younger School by virtue of the role he played in the formation of the Verein für 
Sozialpolitik in 1872-73, and who subsequently became an academic impresario mediating 
between academic and official institutions, as a consequence acquiring great influence over 
appointments and promotions in Prussian universities.”(Ibid., p. 9). Since a qualification in 
law was routinely required for posts in public administration, as well as the legal system itself, 
the place of economics teaching in the late nineteenth century German university was secured 
by its place in the legal curriculum (Ibid., p. 2). 
 Recent historical findings concerning activities of Schmoller and his colleagues in the 
Verein für Socialpolitik [(Balabkins, 1988), (Priddat, 1995), (Schellschmidt, 1997), (Peukert, 
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2001a), (Peukert, 2001b), (Grimmer-Solem, 2003)] have showed its non-partisan scientific 
character. The result of these activities had national and even international value. Thank to 
their efforts Germany was one of the first countries to define a "social question" and develop 
a modern welfare state. Schmoller and his colleagues were successful in convincing the 
German government in the necessity of the reforms for solving the social question. A decade 
later of the Verein‘s foundation, the head of German government, Otto von Bismarck, had the 
following discourse: “<...> the actual complaint of the worker is the insecurity of his 
existence; he is unsure if he will always have work, he is unsure if he will always be healthy 
and he can predict that he will reach old age and be unable to work. If he falls into poverty, 
and be that only through prolonged illness, he will find himself totally helpless being on his 
own, and society currently does not accept any responsibility towards him beyond the usual 
provisions for the poor, even if he has been working all the time ever so diligently and 
faithfully. The ordinary provision for the poor, however, leaves a lot to be desired <...>“. The 
governmental reform program included Health Insurance, Accident Insurance (Workman’s 
Compensation), Disability Insurance, and an Old-age Retirement Pension, none of which 
were then currently in existence to any great degree. Bismarck opened debate on the subject 
on 17 November 1881 in the Imperial Message to the Reichstag, using the term practical 
Christianity to describe his program. Based on Bismarck’s message, the Reichstag filed three 
bills designed to deal with the concept of Accident insurance, and one for Health Insurance. 
The subjects of Retirement pensions and Disability Insurance were placed aside for the time 
being. The law concerning them was adopted several years later
7
.  
 The epistemic culture of the younger German historical school totally corresponds to 
the vocation of the scholar as it was defined by Fichte: the most widely extended survey of the 
actual advancement of the human race in general, and the steadfast promotion of that 
advancement. Nevertheless this epistemic culture contradicts totally to the present 
professional activities of both orthodox and most of the heterodox streams of economics. We 
cannot call these activities of communities of economists an epistemic culture, because these 
activities are not oriented to knowledge acquisition about the real world but represent 
activities of the construction of some imaginary worlds. Usual accusation against German 
historical school and American institutionalism at the turn of 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries lie in the 
absence of theories. Now economics is understood as the theory, or at best as theories. To get 
a professional training in economics means primarily to learn economic theories. To practice 
research means either construct/improve theories or apply them. As we could see earlier, it 
does not correspond at all to the understanding of research activities in natural sciences. It is 
this discrepancy that is the main cause of the failure of economics to bring to people 
knowledge/understanding on the socio-politico-economic world in which we live. Some 
honest members of the profession confess: “I believe that as an economic theorist, I have very 
little to say about the real world and that there are very few models in economic theory that 
can be used to provide serious advice” (Rubinstein, 2006, p. 881). Can you imagine that, for 
example, Werner Heisenberg could say something similar? I think no, you cannot imagine it. 
Nevertheless the author of this declaration is not a marginalised member of the community of 
academic economists, but its very honourable member: the text is part of his Presidential 
Address to the Econometric Society made in 2004. In his paper-confession, he continues: “As 
economic theorists, we organize our thoughts using what we call models. The word “model” 
sounds more scientific than “fable” or “fairy tale” although I do not see much difference 
between them” (Ibid.).; “What are we trying to accomplish as economic theorists? We 
essentially play with toys called models. We have the luxury of remaining children over the 
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course of our entire professional lives and we are even well paid for it. We get to call 
ourselves economists and the public naively thinks that we are improving the economy’s 
performance, increasing the rate of growth, or preventing economic catastrophes. Of course, 
we can justify this image by repeating some of the same fancy sounding slogans we use in our 
grant proposals, but do we ourselves believe in those slogans?”(Ibid., p. 865). We can ask 
ourselves what is the cause of this confession? I suppose to find the answer in the following 
statements of the author: “I cannot ignore the fact that our work as teachers and researchers 
influences students’ minds and does so in a way with which I am not comfortable.”(Ibid., 
p. 881); “I am a teacher of microeconomics. I am a part of the “machine” that I suspect is 
influencing students to think in a way that I do not particularly like.”(Ibid., p. 877). The 
answer is very simple: the priest and theologian is not very happy with the religion he deals 
with.  Most of his colleagues do not have this problem. “Fairy tale” nature of the orthodox and 
of most of the heterodox economics, based on mathematical models or not, is evident.  
Nevertheless economists prefer not to see it.  
 In the middle of the 19
th
 century August Comte proposed a three stage scheme of 
modes of making theories. According to it each of the leading conceptions, each branch of the 
knowledge, passes successively through three different theoretical conditions: the 
Theological, or fictitious; the Metaphysical, or abstract; and the Scientific, or positive (Comte, 
2003, pp. 25 – 26). Schmoller indicated that the economics of his time was still at the 
metaphysical stage. I suppose that he could not suspect that a hundred years later it will come 
down to a lower stage, the theological one. The quotation which follows is taken from the 
section “Toward a Civic Religion” of the book of one the guru of contemporary economics: 
“This book is an expression of the hope that a new ‘civic religion’ is on the way to being 
born, a civic religion that will return, in part, to the skepticism of the eighteenth century 
concerning politics and government and that, quite naturally, will concentrate our attention on 
the rules that constrain governments rather than on innovations that justify ever expanding 
political intrusions into the lives of citizens. Our normative role, as social philosophers, is to 
shape this civic religion, surely a challenge sufficient to us all” (Brennan and Buchanan, 
2000). Now, when the world is plunged into such a profound economic crisis provoked by the 
deregulation, this sentence sounds especially sinisterly.  
At present the German historical school is almost forgotten in the community of 
economists. In many manuals of history of economic thought it is not even mentioned. Its 
continuation in the USA, the so called old institutionalism, has practically the same fate.  
Nevertheless, beginning from 1980’s, the approach used Schmoller’s and Commons’s schools 
has been resuscitated in American political science under the name of Historical 
Institutionalism. Sometimes it is considered even larger as a social science method: 
“Historical institutionalism is a social science method that uses institutions in order to find 
sequences of social, political, economic behavior and change across time. It is a comparative 
approach to the study of all aspects of human organizations and does so by relying heavily on 
case studies”8. Political scientists usually link the birth of historical institutionalism with the 
publication of the book of Theda Skocpol (1979). Sometimes representatives of this current 
are nominated as historical-interpretive institutionalists (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth 
1992, p. 7)
9
. This school competes in political science with Rational Choice Institutionalism 
coming from new institutional economics. These two institutionalisms make together in 
political science New Institutionalism: “<…> new institutionalism in Canada tends to be 
historical institutionalism, whereas in the United States it is about evenly divided between the 
rational choice and historical streams” (Lecours 2005, p. 4). Historical Institutionalism in 
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political science continues traditions of the German historical school headed by Gustav 
Schmoller, thus it has to be classified as belonging to New Institutionalism, rather than to the 
Old Institutionalism, as it is practiced in the community of economists. In the English 
language economic literature of the end of 19
th
 century, the German historical school was 
very often called the New School (Ely, 1884, p. 43).  
 Theda Skocpol has never felt any respect whatsoever for disciplinary boundaries 
(Skocpol, 1999, p. 16). Just like Schmoller and his colleagues she thinks that “social science 
should take up important, real-world problems and not simply engage in navel gazing 
discussions of purely internal theoretical or methodological issues” (Ibid.). According to her 
in the Schmollerian spirit, social science has to fulfill “’a civilizing mission’ - social scientists 
should take up substantively important problems with broader significance to the communities 
with whom they are communicating, and then seek rigorous answers about outcomes of 
interest” (Ibid.). She expresses evaluations very similar to Schmoller: “Approaches ranging 
from the Marxist <…> to the rational choice often try to understand politics as a function of 
an immediate economically determined equilibrium. I simply do not believe we can 
understand political outcomes without highlighting historical path dependencies” (Ibid., p.17). 
The following sentence sounds as if it is Schmoller who speaks: “Institutions embody ideas. 
Actually they marry them to resources and patterns of power, social power, and institutions 
certainly offer definitions of the situation. At the level of political psychology, that explains 
why people simply are not short-term instrumentalists. They accept definitions of the situation 
that seem workable and are backed by powerful relationships. People have to deal with such 
institutionalized definitions of the situation on a day to day basis” (Ibid., p.18).  At last 
Skocpol is willing to study “what is” and not “what ought to be”: “I am a social scientist. I 
believe there is a difference between science and normative work, and good social science is 
not exactly the same thing as advocacy, though advocacy always benefits from sound 
scholarship” (Ibid., p.19).   
 Very often Schmoller’s and Commons’s institutionalism are accused by the 
economists to be politically not neutral. In fact the accusation concerns their embodiment in 
the analysis of asymmetries in power relations. Apparently political scientists do not have 
problems with it. “Historical institutionalists accepted the contention that conflict among rival 
groups for scarce resources lies at the heart of politics”, they found explanations of 
inequalities that mark national political outcomes “in the way the institutional organization of 
the polity and economy structures conflict so as to privilege some interests while 
demobilizing others”. German economists the hundred years ago saw the state in the same 
way as American political scientists now: many historical institutionalists see “the state no 
longer as a neutral broker among competing interests but as a complex of institutions capable 
of structuring the character and outcomes of group conflict”. Analysts in this school explore 
how “social and political institutions associated with labour and capital, could structure 
interactions so as to generate distinctive national trajectories”. “Historical institutionalists 
have been especially attentive to the way in which institutions distribute power unevenly 
across social groups. Rather than posit scenarios of freely-contracting individuals, for 
instance, they are more likely to assume a world in which institutions give some groups or 
interests disproportionate access to the decision-making process; and, rather than emphasize 
the degree to which an outcome makes everyone better off, they tend to stress how some 
groups lose while others win.” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp. 941 - 947) 
 Why historical institutionalism at the turn of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries in Germany 
and the United States had been abandoned by communities of academic economists? An 
understanding of this phenomenon is the central task of this paper. Comparative historical 
institutional analysis of economics in three countries gives us the possibility to get this 
understanding. Right now I will present here just a preliminary summary of this 
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understanding. The political economy of Adam Smith was a political/social/moral philosophy 
and not a science as it was practiced by first scientists Galileo and Gilbert and has been 
institutionalised in the framework of the Royal Society of London. This political economy can 
be classified according to August Comte’s law of stages as metaphysical or abstract using a 
priori method. Both “homo oeconomicus” and “invisible hand” were the expressions of the 
Providence, of God’s design and will10. This kind of discipline could not satisfy in the middle 
of the 19
th
 century the scientifically oriented economists in German research university. Based 
on traditions of scientific research in natural experimental sciences and on the values of 
scholars formulated by Humboldt and Fichte, German professors of economics have 
developed an institution of economics with its central element Verein für Socialpolitik. This 
institution was oriented not for the self-protection of the community of economists but for the 
fulfilment of the mission: help to the state to solve the social question and to protect the new 
German nation from a national catastrophe. Two decades later the institutionalisation of 
economics in England took place. The process happened in an absolutely different 
institutional environment, not in a Humboldt’s research university, but in an almost medieval 
type of universities where curriculum was dominated by mathematics, classics and theology. 
The architect of the British institution of economics, Alfred Marshall followed in its design 
the established university spirit. In addition, the creation of the institutions of economics like 
a secular theology was influenced by his lost of Christian faith, and his adoption of utilitarian 
ideology (Bentham). In this change of belief he followed the dominant cultural tendencies of 
his social environment. It has predetermined his professional choice not to be involved in hard 
and time-consuming empirical research of socio-economic realities but to start developing 
abstract a priori constructions. This choice has been supported by the distorted interpretation 
by John Stuart Mill of the process of knowledge acquisition. This interpretation gave to a 
priori constructions of political economists an aureole of science.  
 Both Schmoller’s and Marshall’s economics were responses to the existence of the 
social question; in England it was even sharper than in Germany, but the responses of 
different types. The former was oriented to helping the state to solve this problem by 
improving conditions of the working class by introducing new social legislation, and in this 
way, to prevent social unrest. The latter was oriented to create scientifically looking 
ideological construction legitimating the existing social order and conditions, and in this way 
to achieve the same goal, to prevent social unrest. Once established the institution of 
Marshallian economics attract much easier the support of those who consider the discipline of 
economics more like a craft than like a vocation. The work of Schmollerian economists as 
researchers and teachers is much more difficult than that of Marshallian economists. Frequent 
surveys/fieldwork and constant adaptation of courses to changing realities are much more 
time and labour consuming than the desk work of “a priori theorists”. Very quickly the 
community of economists-craftsmen can become inaccessible fortress for those who would 
like to practice economics as a vocation with primarily socially-oriented altruistic aspirations. 
The problem with Schmollerian economics in comparison with Marshallian economics is not 
only social but also economic and political. Surveys and fieldwork request strong financial 
and political support on behalf of the governments (local and/or central). The political support 
of Schmollerian types of scholars is necessary because their research activity can discover 
undesirable for owners/managers details of the functioning of their private enterprises. The 
resistance to Schmollerian economists can take place in the domain of surveys and field 
studies’ organisation and financing or in the domain of the recruitment and promotion of 
teachers/researchers controlled by university boards with businessmen as its members. All 
these factors probably played their role in the post-Schmoller’s economics in Germany.  
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 The interwar economic and political crisis could not be of no influence on the German 
community of economists. The Verein für Sozialpolitik has been dissolved in 1936 with the 
arrival to power of Nazis. After World War II, the military presence of the USSR in Eastern 
Germany and of the USA in Western Germany have predetermined the reign of the Marxist-
Leninist political economy (Mittag, 1969) in one part of Germany and of neoclassical 
economics in another part. At least since the fall of the Berlin wall “neoclassical economics 
was and still is dominant in Germany <…> Until recently it was said that ‘Schmoller is 
forever condemned and castigated’ (Peukert, 2002a, p. 72). Nevertheless “it is surprising how  
many younger (German) scholars are interested  in a reconstruction of institutionalism and 
historicism and how few survive the crowding out of the profession after their dissertation” 
(Ibid., p. 97). To my mind the attractiveness of the German school of thought comes from the 
fact that it produced such a rich set of ideas concerning the social world that they continue to 
reappear later. One of its central ideas has been entered in the social constructivism: 
“Institutions always have a history, of which they are the products. It is impossible to 
understand an institution adequately without an understanding of the historical process in 
which it was produced” (Berger and Luckmann, 1991, p. 72).  
 
 
4. Institutionalisation of economics in England as a secular theology 
 
I am more interested in economics as a veil that 
obscures our social understanding than as a 
technique for discovering how our society 
works. What does the veil obscure? That the 
price system is also a system of power; <…> that 
the object over which the veil is spread is not a 
collection of individuals but a specific social 
order to which we give the name capitalism. 
          (Robert L. Heilbroner, 1988, pp. 7 - 8)
  
           
 Historical Institutionalism overlapping in some respects with Social Constructivism 
represents either a social sciences’ approach or some kind social sciences’ frame theory. It is 
this approach that I am using in this paper for analysis of economics. Two central questions 
which I would like to answer in this paper are why the Germany’s born economics has 
disappeared and England’s born economics expanded on a tremendous scale. The key to 
understand it gives the social constructivist connections between institutionalisation and 
social control: “Institutions, by the very fact of their existence, control human conduct by 
setting up predefined patterns of conduct, which channel it in one direction as against the 
many other directions that would theoretically be possible. It is important to stress that this 
controlling character is inherent in institutionalisation as such, prior to or apart from any 
mechanisms of sanctions specifically set up to support an institution” (Berger and Luckmann, 
1991, p. 72). Historical institutionalism underlines connection between institutions and 
ideas/beliefs. Every institution cannot exist without the idea/belief connected with it. It was 
almost always the belief which was linked with the birth of the institution. We have seen that 
institutionalisation of economics in Germany in the second half of the 19
th
 century has been 
very closely linked with the idea shared by natural scientists that scientific knowledge is an 
experimentally based knowledge. Social control in the community of natural scientists is 
finally a control of the veracity of reports concerning conclusions based on data gathering 
and experiments.  The belief which was linked with the birth of the institution of the British 
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economics was absolutely different. It is the idea issued by John Stuart Mill that economics 
cannot use experimental method and should use a priori method. In this section of the paper I 
will first try to analyse, on the basis of autobiography of J.S. Mill, in what way and in what 
kind of social conditions this idea was expressed. Then, using as a source of information the 
biography of Alfred Marshall written by John Maynard Keynes, I will retrace the story of 
Marshall as the architect of British institution of economics, including social conditions of his 
adoption of Mill’s ideas, and personal circumstances of his turn to a priori method. 
Afterwards, using some historical investigations, I will try to paint a picture of the process of 
the economics’ institutionalisation guided by Marshall. I will describe in the next section of 
this paper what kinds of measures of social control were used to promote this institution in the 
United States. We will see later that when institutionalisation is over, social sanctions’ 
“controlling efficacy, however, is of a secondary or supplementary kind. The primary social 
control is given in the existence of an institution as such. To say that a segment of human 
activity has been institutionalised is already to say that this segment of human activity has 
been subsumed under social control. Additional control mechanisms are required only insofar 
as the processes of institutionalisation are less than completely successful.” (Ibid, p, 73) The 
expansion of Anglo-Saxon economics is due to its very successful institutionalisation. On the 
contrary the institution of German born economics was not adapted to changing politico-
economic conditions and this in spite of the fact that its methodology and its contents were 
very efficient for studies of these politico-economic conditions.  
 In the beginning of professionalisation and institutionalisation of economics in Britain 
was the Verb: the idea of John Stuart Mill that Political Economy is and has to be an ‘abstract 
science’, which “must reason from assumptions, not from facts” (Mill, 1994, p. 56). For him 
the model for an abstract science is geometry: “Geometry presupposes an arbitrary definition 
of a line, ‘that which has length but not breadth’. Just in the same way manner does Political 
Economy presuppose an arbitrary definition of man” (Ibid.). This Verb, formulated in 1836, 
determines until now the face of contemporary economics, either orthodox or most of its 
heterodox streams. In his famous statement in the preface to the 1
st
 volume Das Kapital 
(1867) Marx expressed the same idea: “In the analysis of economic forms, more over, neither 
microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both.” 
The idea formulated by J.S. Mill was just a confirmation of the status quo of the political 
economy. In this paper I will not go down to details of the origins of the a priori method in 
classical political economy (Prasch, 1996). It is sufficient to say here that it had its source in 
the medieval scholastic thought. J.S. Mill went never to school or university. His only teacher 
was his father James Mill. The latter did his studies at University of Edinburgh at the expense 
of a fund for educating young men for the Scottish Church. “He there went through the usual 
course of study, and was licensed as a Preacher, but never followed the profession; having 
satisfied himself that he could not believe the doctrines of that or any other Church.” (Mill, 
2008, p. 8)  For a few years he was a private tutor in various families in Scotland, but ended 
by taking up his residence in London, and devoting himself to authorship (Ibid.). From 1806 
to 1818 he was engaged in writing his History of India. Although he sharply criticized the 
East India Company and the British administration in India, in 1819 he was appointed to a 
position in the examiner's office of the India House in London
11
. James Mill solicited a post in 
this company for his son, position which was his only employment until his retirement.   
 J.S. Mill wrote in his autobiography: “I was brought up from the first without any 
religious belief, in the ordinary acceptation of the term. My father, educated in the creed of 
Scotch presbyterianism, had by his own studies and reflections been early led to reject not 
only the belief in revelation, but the foundations of what is commonly called Natural 
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Religion” (Ibid., p. 25). The beliefs of Mill-son have come from his father’s friend, Jeremy 
Bentham, founder of Utilitarism: “When I laid down the last volume of the [Bentham’s] 
Traité [de Législation], I had become a different being. The ‘principle of utility’ understood as 
Bentham understood it, and applied in the manner in which he applied it through these three 
volumes, fell exactly into its place as the keystone which held together the detached and 
fragmentary component parts of my knowledge and beliefs. It gave unity to my conceptions 
of things. I now had opinions; a creed, a doctrine, a philosophy; in one among the best senses 
of the word, a religion; the inculcation and diffusion of which could be made the principal 
outward purpose of a life
12” (Ibid., p. 40). Another favouring reading of young Mill was the 
book of Bentham, published under a pseudonym, "Analysis of the Influence of Natural 
Religion on the Temporal Happiness of Mankind"
13: “This was an examination not of the 
truth, but of the usefulness of religious belief, in the most general sense, apart from the 
peculiarities of any special Revelation <…> when those who reject revelation, very generally 
take refuge in an optimistic Deism, a worship of the order of Nature, and the supposed course 
of Providence <…> Next to the Traité de Législation, it was one of the books which by the 
searching character of its analysis produced the greatest effect upon me” (Ibid., 
p. 42). Graduated from the University of Edinburgh  on the basis with a diploma of a 
Preacher, i.e. primarily theological education, James Mill certainly could not transfer to his 
son a spirit of experimental sciences. Both Mills were not Christians and became 
theologicians of Benthamian utilitarist “religion”. Many other British political economists 
fulfilled the same function and J.S. Mill followed them.  
 Almost two hundred years after the founding of the Royal Society (1660) and the 
spread of the "Baconian" method, when the transformation of the meaning and application of 
empirical knowledge took place, British political economists tried to interpret their a priori 
method as an empirical one. Among them, may be the most advanced in this way of reasoning 
was Nassau Senior. “As late as 1836, Senior argued that the study of political economy should 
begin with a short list of broadly accepted and acknowledged premises understood as "general 
facts" <…> According to Senior, the premises of political economy were to be founded upon 
facts that "… are, however, so nearly self-evident, that we will venture in the mean time to 
assume their truth". <…> The "general facts" proposed as premises by Senior were as 
follows: (1) people are self-interested, (2) population is limited by available resources, (3) 
produced means of production enhance the productivity of labour, and (4) in the absence of 
technical change, diminishing marginal returns are evident in agriculture. Senior argued that 
the first could be derived through the method of introspection and that the others were 
trivially evident in our collective experience of the world” (Prasch, 1996). Senior was 
“convinced that his short list of "general facts" established a firm foundation for a genuinely 
empirical science of political economy”. As such, he considered his method to be fully 
consistent with the empirical science pioneered by Bacon and Newton. “Satisfied with the 
soundness of his own approach, Senior criticised what he alleged to be the "hypothetical" 
approach advanced by John S. Mill: "But neither the reasoning of Mr. Mill, nor the example 
of Mr. Ricardo, induce me to treat Political Economy as a hypothetical science. I do not think 
it necessary, and, if unnecessary, I do not think it desirable"” (Ibid.). We can conclude that 
J.S. Mill was more intellectually honest than N. Senior. His “Principles of Economics” had 
served a methodological model for the creator of the British institution of economics which 
during the 20
th
 century expanded all over the world.  
 Unlike J.S. Mill, Alfred Marshall went to school when he was nine years old. Ancient 
languages occupied an important part of the curricular. At the beginning, his father actively 
participated in the teaching of his son, as James Mill did with John Stuart: “He used to make 
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the boy work with him for school, often in Hebrew, until eleven at night” (Keynes, 1963,  
pp. 126 – 127). As a good pupil at school after its graduation “he became entitled in 1861 [at 
the age of 19 years old], under old statutes, to a scholarship at Oxford, which would have led 
in three years to a Fellowship <…> It was the first step to ordination in the Evangelical 
ministry for which his father designed him” (Ibid., p. 128). For Alfred it would mean a 
continued servitude to the Classics. Alfred did not like to learn ancient languages but was 
very capable in mathematics. Mathematics represented for him emancipation from the tyranny 
of his father who could not understand them. Alfred did not want “to be buried at Oxford 
under dead languages”. His objective was to go to Cambridge to study mathematics. At 
Cambridge, Marshall fulfilled his ambitions. In 1865 he was elected to a Fellowship where he 
wanted to devote himself to the study of molecular physics. But this desire (in his own words) 
“cut short by the sudden rise of a deep interest in the philosophical foundation of knowledge, 
especially in relation to theology” (Ibid., pp. 128 - 131). “In Marshall’s undergraduate days at 
Cambridge a preference for Mathematics over Classics had not interfered with the integrity of 
his early beliefs. He still looked forward to ordination, and his zeal directed itself at times 
towards the field of Foreign Missions. A missionary he remained all his life, but after a quick 
struggle religious beliefs dropped away and he became, for the rest of his life, what used to be 
called an agnostic.”  (Ibid., p. 133).  Marshall’s Cambridge career took place at the period 
when in England, or at least in Cambridge, Christian dogma disappeared in the serious 
philosophical teachings. The youthful mind of that time was directed by Metaphysical 
agnosticism (Herbert Spencer), Evolutionary progress (Darwin) and Utilitarian ethics 
(Bentham) (Ibid., pp. 134 -136). 
 At the end of his life Marshall said: “From Metaphysics I went to Ethics, and thought 
that the justification of the existing condition of society was not easy
14
. A friend, who had read 
a great deal of what are now called Moral Sciences,  constantly said: ’Ah ! if you understand 
Political Economy you would not say that.’ So I read Mill’s Political Economy and got much 
excited about it. I had doubts as to the propriety of inequalities of opportunity, rather than of 
material comfort. Then, in my vacations I visited the poorest quarters of several cities and 
walked through one street after another, looking in the faces of the poorest people. Next, I 
resolved to make as thorough a study as I could of Political Economy.” (Ibid., p. 137)  As we 
can see young Marshall was touched in the same way as Schmoller by the existence of ‘the 
social question’. “In 1868, when he was still in his metaphysical stage, a desire to read Kant 
in the original led him to Germany. ‘Kant my guide’, he once said, ‘the only man I ever 
worship: but I could not get further: beyond seemed misty, and social problems came 
imperceptibly to the front. Are the opportunities of real life to be confined to a few?’ <…> 
Hegel’s Philosophy of History greatly influenced him. He came also in contact with the work 
of the German economists, particularly Roscher.” (Ibid., p. 138 - 139) Finally Marshall settled 
down in Cambridge as a lecturer in Moral Science, giving courses on Political Economy, but 
also on Logic and Bentham. “He was attracted towards the new views of economics taken by 
Roscher and other German economists <…> He set himself to get into closer contact with 
practical business and with the life of the working classes. On the one side he aimed at 
learning the broad features of the technique of every chief industry; and on the other he 
sought the society of trade unionists, co-operators and other working-class leaders. Seeing, 
however, that direct studies of life and work would not yield much fruit for many years, he 
decided to fill the interval by writing a separate monograph or a special treatise on Foreign 
Trade; for the chief facts relating to it can be obtained from printed documents. He proposed 
that this should be the first of a group of monographs on special economic problems.” (Ibid., 
p. 151).  Bu he has never realised his plans.  
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 As a biographer of Marshall, J.M. Keynes, wrote: “The fateful decision was the 
abandonment of the project to write ‘a group of monographs on special economic problems’ 
in favour of a comprehensive treatise which should be born complete and fully armed from 
the head of an economic Jove” (Ibid., p. 152). In the second half of the 19th century the social 
question existed in Britain even in a more sharp form than in Germany, but the professional 
reaction of British economists, including Alfred Marshall, to the social question was totally 
different from the reaction of German economists, including Gustav Schmoller. We could see 
just above that at the very beginning of his career as an economist, Marshall had intentions to 
follow the way of Germans. Keynes explained his refusal to fulfil his initial plans by some 
personal circumstances, his marriage and “an illness so serious that for some time Marshall 
appeared unlikely to be able to do any more hard work” (Ibid.). However I think that these 
personal circumstances are not the only causes of his decision. I suppose that his social 
environment has influenced this decision more than the circumstances. Keynes has discovered 
in the Marshall’s archive a document (a manuscript) that, in my mind, can throw light on the 
deepest cause of the professional orientation of young Marshall. In this manuscript, which 
was designed for the Preface to the book Money, Credit and Commerce, Marshall wrote: 
“About the year 1867 (while mainly occupied with teaching Mathematics at Cambridge) [I 
have been in] touch with the question: how far do the conditions of life of the British (and 
other) working classes generally suffice for fullness of life? Older and wiser told me that the 
resources of production do not suffice for affording to the great body of the people the leisure 
and the opportunity for study; and they told me that I needed to study Political Economy. I 
followed their advice, and regarded myself as a wanderer in the land of dry facts; looking 
forward to a speedy return to the luxuriance of pure thought” (Ibid., p. 138). I suppose that 
“older and wiser men” advised him to study Political Economy to find there an answer to his 
question of a sort that the poverty of the great body of the people was inevitable and 
everybody in the British society got according to his merits, and it was not worthwhile to 
think about any social change/reform. I can guess that the same “older and wiser men” could 
hardly approve his desire to “get into closer contact with practical business and with the life 
of the working classes” and a “society of trade unionists, co-operators and other working-
class leaders”. I also assume that Marshall’s decision not to do fieldwork investigations has 
been dictated by the fact that “direct studies of life and work would not yield much fruit for 
many years”. At last but not least, scholastic traditions of Cambridge of that time shared by 
Marshall’s superiors and colleagues certainly did not encourage this kind of activities by the 
faculty staff. On the contrary, Marshall was very strong in mathematics and the notion of 
applying mathematical methods in economics was in the air. His social environment probably 
should have supported his engagement in this domain. Thus, Marshall remained during a very 
short time “a wanderer in the land of dry facts” and his social environment has pushed him “to 
a speedy return to the luxuriance of pure thought”. We probably can make the conclusion that 
in the values shared by Marshall, values of a “craftsman” working to earn his life dominated 
the values of an “altruist investigator” working to understand social reality in order to 
contribute to its improvement (the vision of J. Fichte). Certainly, Utilitarian ideas of J.S. Mill 
and his definition of economics as an abstract science have helped Marshall to legitimate his 
position.   
 Unlike in Germany, in England of the 19
th
 century, one might be called “economist” 
without this automatically implying an employment as university teacher; to be an 
“economist” in Great Britain at this time meant the feature of a certain “social and political 
culture – hence the foundation and naming of The Economist in 1843 as a journal to support 
the cause of Free Trade” (Tribe, 2002, p. 4). Political economy was a hot topic in popular 
reviews and clubs, but was relatively neglected in universities (Fourcade, 2009, p. 132). 
Before the creation of the Royal Economic Society, “the Political Economy Club of London, 
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founded in 1821, provided an organisational centre for the discussion and propagation of 
‘sound’ doctrines, particularly free trade. However, it was but one of many such private clubs 
at home and abroad, and the other prerequisites of professionalisation were lacking. ” (Coats, 
1993, p. 402). Practitioners of political economy, like members of this club, were leisured 
gentlemen, enlightened businessmen, intellectuals, journalists, statesmen, and civil servants 
(Fourcade, 2009, p. 132). The profession of university teachers of economics was 
underdeveloped: “In the mid-1890s there were only two full-time Professors of Political 
Economy – Marshall in Cambridge and Gonner in Liverpool – although some teachers, like 
Flux in Manchester, were fully occupied with a wide range of teaching” (Tribe, 2002, p. 4). 
Until the 1890 neither commercial professions nor the British civil service considered 
political economy as a useful discipline (Fourcade, 2009, pp. 131 – 132). Alfred Marshall was 
a real architect of the British institution of economics, which became a model for this 
institution in the United States and, after World War II, and especially after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, with “Americanisation” of the discipline, for the whole world. However the 
architect acted in a determined social environment, in the framework of a specific elite culture 
which  “was heavily vested in ‘classics’” that included also mathematics, “regarded as part of 
a ‘classical heritage’ going to the Greeks” (Ibid., p. 149). “Natural sciences were incorporated 
quite late in British university education, sometimes not until 1880s” and “mathematics <…> 
throughout the nineteenth century reigned at Cambridge as a fundamental component of the 
prestigious tripos examination system” (Ibid.). In this intellectual atmosphere it is the 
connection of a discipline with mathematical method, and not with experimental one, which 
was the decisive sign of a truly “scientific” character of the discipline. In order ‘to merit’ this 
indication British economists were oriented to “the progressive elimination of most inductive 
and historical elements from the core of political economy, and concomitant ascendancy of 
the deductive method” (Ibid.).   
 “In 1885, when Marshall became professor of political economy at Cambridge, the 
condition of his subject was profoundly discouraging, and its immediate prospects seemed 
little better <…> Political economy still formed only a minor element in a traditional 
curriculum dominated by classics and theology; <…> and it was virtually ignored in the 
examination system of what has rightly been called an ‘exam ridden’ country” (Coats, 1993, 
p. 106). He improved social position of the discipline by several institutional measures. First, 
Marshall elaborated and introduced a unified examination system in economics (Ibid., p. 111), 
and in this way, all British students of economics passed through the purgatory of his 
neoclassical economics. This examination system “was a centripetal force tending to 
counteract the effects of the disintegration of classical dogma, a process which might 
otherwise have proved destructive at a time when provincial centres of academic economics 
were growing” (Ibid., p. 120). Secondly, he endeavoured quite successfully to eliminate the 
methodological disagreements in the community of academic economists and strengthen the 
sense of continuity and local loyalty, deference to authority and respect for tradition (Ibid., p. 
107 - 109). Thirdly, he encouraged “specialised inductive studies only after and not before the 
B.A. degree” (Ibid., p. 111) and thus invited students to see the reality through the spectacles 
of his theory.  At last, I suppose that Marshall realised that a successful start of an institution 
depends to a great extent on the initial membership of the community which follows newly 
introduced rules and shares ideas/values standing behind these rules. As one of his 
contemporary witnesses in this direction he was also successful: “half the economic chairs in 
the United Kingdom are [were] occupied by his [Marshall’s] pupils, and the share taken by 
them in general economic instruction in England is [was] even larger than this” (Ibid., p. 107), 
“Marshall undoubtedly had a voice in most appointments in England (and possibly in Britain 
and the Commonwealth too) during his quarter-century as professor at Cambridge” (Ibid., pp. 
121 – 122).     
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 In comparison with Verein für Sozialpolitik, the Royal Economic Society created in 
Great Britain in 1890 was of an absolutely different nature. As we can judge by analysing the 
report of the inauguration meeting of this society (The Economic Journal, March, 1891, 
pp. 1 – 14), its main objective was the publication of a journal. At this meeting Alfred 
Marshall was opposed to the idea of holding meetings for discussions: “they might be 
attended chiefly by people whose time was not very valuable” (Ibid., p. 8). He was in favour 
of controlling of membership and opinions. A speaker at the meeting expressed ideas “which 
were not quite consistent with the catholicity which Professor Marshall has demanded” this 
control. Concerning membership “persons were required not only to desire to further the aims 
of the Association, but to be approved by the council before they could be admitted to 
membership. Probably some gentleman present would like to have these words omitted” 
(Ibid., p.9).  The same speaker noted that “Professor Marshall would say that there must be 
authority somewhere, and some opinions must be excluded” (Ibid.). The Royal Economic 
Society was born not as an association of researchers similar to the Royal Society of London 
for the Improvement of Natural Knowledge but as a guild of craftsmen-economists, i.e. of 
persons belonging to the profession of university teachers of economics.   
 Schmoller’s Verein included many members which were not academics but 
administrators. German economists worked with very close contacts with practical men. On 
the contrary, the British community of academic economists followed the tradition of 
distancing from the latter. Ricardians already had as the source of their influence “their claim 
for scientific authority which they strenuously asserted in books, pamphlets, magazines, 
newspapers, official enquiries and parliamentary debates” (Coats, 1993, p. 402). In their 
aspiration to look ‘scientists’ “the most distinctive feature was their effort to distance 
themselves, as experts, from the amateurs, especially despised ‘practical’ men” (Ibid.) James 
Mill, father of the J.S. Mill, has formulated it in the following way: “a reasoner must be hard 
pressed when he is driven to quote practical men in aid of his conclusions. There can not be a 
worse authority, in any branch of political science, than that of mere practical men” (Ibid.). 
British political economists of the 19
th
 century tried to simulate the behaviour of natural 
scientists in a very superficial way by distancing from ‘non-scientists’, but ignoring the most 
important feature of their behaviour: experimental contact with the object under study. They 
did not realise that ‘practical men’ for many types of information are the only sources 
available. Practical men are elements of the objects of study and not being in contact with 
them for those who work as scientists in socio-politico-economic domains means to work 
with ‘switched off recording devices’.  In the domain of natural sciences it would mean the 
end of the profession of scientific researcher. Qualitative research methods like interviews, 
narrative inquiry, participant observation and participatory action research (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2005), channel contacts of researchers with practical men, which are functional 
analogues of laboratory practices in natural sciences. German economists understood it, but 
British not. A few English economists, like William Cunningham, who were willing to follow 
the German example, were ostracized. Neither British state nor business community were 
interested in empirically based economic research, but both of them were interested in the 
existence of a theology legitimating their power. With the gradual disappearance of Christian 
belief supporting the power of king and landlords, new beliefs were absolutely necessary to 
legitimate the new social order: capitalism. These beliefs are provided by the neoclassical 
economics. This kind of functions totally corresponds to the British university traditions. 
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5. Institutionalisation of economics in the United States: from “craftsman” to  
   “merchant” 
 
I asked myself the question, “Did [Columbia 
College, where I have had three years as an 
undergraduate,] stimulate and encourage that 
research which results in significant thought?” 
<…> The only honest answer I could give 
myself was “no”. The centre of attention was 
occupied by classics and mathematics, and the 
question of academic freedom did not even 
arise.         
               (Richard T. Ely, 1938, p. 124) 
 
 
 The German and English approaches were confronted in the United States at the end 
of the 19
th
 century. At this time, this country had two types of universities. On the one hand, 
universities inherited from the colonial period, when territories on which the United States 
were created were just overseas territories of Great Britain; these universities were naturally 
created on the British model. On the other hand, after the Independence, new universities 
appeared in the United States, which were directly created as research universities, having as 
a model the German one. Harvard University belonged to the first type. First founded as 
Harvard College in 1639, it is the oldest university of the country. At the beginning, it was a 
Congregationalist educational establishment, which, during many years, trained Puritan 
ministers. It was named after a young British clergyman named John Harvard. The College 
followed the English university model. A brochure, published in 1643, justified the College's 
existence: "To advance Learning and perpetuate it to Posterity; dreading to leave an illiterate 
Ministry to the Churches". Its motto was Veritas Christo et Ecclesiae "Truth for Christ and 
the Church." Gradually, specialised faculties and schools appeared. At present Harvard 
University consists of nine faculties, among which Harvard Divinity School created in 1816
15
. 
John Hopkins University was directly created in 1876 according to the German model of 
research university. Its president, Daniel C. Gilman, stated that the goal of the university was 
"the encouragement of research…and the advancement of individual scholars, who by their 
excellence will advance the sciences they pursue, and the society where they dwell." 
Following Humboldt’s concept, he merged teaching and research; he dismissed the idea that 
the two were mutually exclusive. John Hopkins University was the first American university 
to teach through seminars, instead of solely through lectures. The motto of this university was 
Veritas vos liberabit – "The truth will free you." Maybe the reader can already guess among 
these two universities which one will become a citadel of the neoclassical economics and 
which one will open the door for scientific (based on experimental approach) economic 
research in the United States. 
    Frank William Taussig (1859-1940) was not included by Mark Blaug in his list of 
100 great economists before Keynes, but it does not correspond to his influence on the 
institutional evolution of economics in the United States. Now we can say that his influence is 
really worldwide because after World War II, American economics dominates in the Western 
World. He played in the U.S. a similar role than Alfred Marshall in Great Britain. He was the 
key person to spread in the U.S. neoclassical economics. He graduated from Harvard and 
occupied a highly influential position in American economics as a professor of this university 
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from 1885 to 1935. He influenced the profession of economist in the U.S. by his 1911 
textbook and his control on the Quarterly Journal of Economics. He was the editor of this 
journal from 1889 to 1890 and from 1896 to 1935. In 1904-1905 Taussig was president of the 
American Economic Association
16
 but he was not its founder. The founder of this association 
was Richard Theodore Ely (1854-1943). Unlike Taussig, Ely was included by Blaug in his list 
of 100 great economists. In his Ely’s short professional biography, Blaug quite well depicts 
his professional life story as a sequence of events, but my interpretation of this story will be 
totally different.  
 In 1876 Ely graduated from Columbia College. A year after, he went for 3 years to 
Germany for graduate and post-graduate studies. In Halle, he met one of his American friends 
who introduced him to his professor Johannes Conrad (1863-1915), co-organiser of 
Schmollerian Verein für Sozialpolitik and chief editor of the influential journal, Jahrbücher 
für Nationalökonomie und Statistik. Young Ely hesitated in his choice in profession between 
philosophy and economics. Under the influence of lectures of Conrad, he made his choice in 
favour of economics. In 1878, he came to Heidelberg for PhD studies under the guidance of 
Karl Knies (1821-1898) and got his degree within a year. Knies’ books and lectures became 
for him a kind of bible (Ely, 1938, p.111). He remembered: “From Knies and others I was 
learning a fundamentally scientific approach in which relativity and evolution played a large 
role.” (Ibid., p.58) This approach denies that the same policies can be good for all times and 
all countries, and in its way, it totally rejects dogmatic English economics. Under the 
influence of Knies, he also understood that men rather than abstract mechanical laws of the 
classicists should stand at the centre of all economic studies (Rader, 1966, p.13). Knies was a 
representative of the old German historical school, but Conrad was a member of the new one, 
of which Schmoller was the leader. Certainly Ely was inevitably under the influence of 
Schmoller who affirmed that German economics had come to a historical and ethical 
conception of the state and society, totally different from that expressed by neoclassicists and 
Marxists. According to him, it was no longer a mere theory of market and exchange, a kind of 
political economy of business, which threatened to become a class weapon of the wealthy. He 
proclaimed that it has become again a great political and moral science, which studied 
production of goods and their distribution, the exchange phenomena and also economic 
institutions. This science has placed the men in the very centre of its studies, and no longer 
commodities and capital.
17
    
 From 1881 to 1892, Ely taught in John Hopkins University. This period was for him 
the most productive and at the same time the most difficult in his career. As a matter of fact, 
persons sharing the same views as Taussig were very numerous in American universities. Ely, 
as an advocate of ideas and approaches of German historical school, was often attacked by 
some of his colleagues, and not all students correctly appreciated his critics of a priori abstract 
approach and his account of German alternative approach to economic research (Ibid., p. 29). 
During the second year of his work in John Hopkins University, he already presented at the 
university seminar a polemical paper called “The Past and the Present of Political Economy”. 
Later he published an extended version of this paper under the form of a brochure which is 
ended with the following sentences: “… the historical method of pursuing political economy 
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can lead to no doctrinaire extremes. Experience is the basis; and should an adherent of this 
school even believes in socialism as the ultimate form of society, he would advocate a slow 
approach to what he deemed the best organization of mankind. If experience showed him that 
the realization of his ideas was leading to harm, he would call for a halt. For he desires that 
advance should be made step by step, and opportunity given for careful observation of the 
effects of a given course of action. Again: this younger political economy no longer permits 
the science to be used as a tool in the hands of the greedy and the avaricious for keeping down 
and oppressing the laboring classes. It does not acknowledge laissez-faire as an excuse for 
doing nothing while people starve, nor allow the all-sufficiency of competition as a plea for 
grinding the poor. It denotes a return to the grand principle of common sense and Christian 
precept. Love, generosity, nobility of character, self-sacrifice, and all that is best and truest in 
our nature have their place in economic life.” (Ely, 1884, p. 64)  
 The president of the university, Daniel Gilman, was upset by the appearance in the 
press of a sharp critical reaction on this publication. Fortunately for Ely a powerful regent of 
the university wrote to Gilman reassuringly: “The critique represents the school of laissez-
faire, to which I incline myself very strongly, but Political Economy is not a completed 
science and the Historical School has something to say for itself” (Rader, 1966, p. 31). 
However, mathematician Simon Newcomb (1835 – 1909), soon sent a letter to the president 
Gilman concerning this brochure. In this letter he wrote: “It looks a little incongruous, to see 
so sweeping and wholesale attack upon the introduction of any rational or scientific method in 
economics come from a university whose other specialities have tended in the opposite 
direction <…> I have never been able to see any essential difference between the objections 
raised against political economy from the new school point of view and the general objections 
of the public against the value of theoretical science.” (Rader, 1966, p. 32) It is worthwhile to 
mention here some biographical details of Newcomb because he was one of the first 
representatives of later very numerous specie of persons trained in mathematics and/or 
theoretical physics who tried their chances in economics. In spite of the peripheral character 
of economics in his professional interests and occupations, Newcomb was included by Blaug 
in his list of the 100 greatest economists before Keynes. “A follower of Stanley Jevons, 
Newcomb, wanted to introduce more mathematics and the concept of marginal utility into 
economics” (Ibid.)  
 Newcomb graduated from Lawrence Scientific School of Harvard University with BS 
degree in 1858. He supported himself with some school-teaching before becoming a human 
computer (a functionary in charge of calculations) at the Nautical Almanac Office in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1857, of which in 1877 he became the director
18
. In 1861 he 
became a professor of mathematics in the US Navy, and professor of mathematics and 
astronomy at Johns Hopkins University. In 1885 he published a book with the same title than 
Marshall’s textbook:  Principles of Political Economy. What attracted Newcomb, and later, 
especially during and after World War II, many of those who mastered and loved 
mathematics, in economics?  I suppose it was, and continues to be, the easiness for them to 
get highly evaluated in the profession of economics “scientific results”. Because of the 
tradition, coming from the University of Cambridge, to consider application of mathematics 
as a summit of “scientificity”, it was very attractive to enter the scientific community via 
economics with much more chances and far fewer efforts to succeed than it would have been 
require via physics. We do not have memoirs or interviews of Newcomb, but I think we can 
better understand motivations of Newcomb by analysing those of Paul Samuelson who was 
actively interviewed. Once Samuelson told: “I became an economist quite by chance, 
primarily because the analysis was so interesting and easy” (Szenberg, Gottesman and 
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Rarattan, 2005, p. 33). It was so easy “as fishing in a virgin Canadian lake. You threw in your 
hook and out came theorem after theorem” (Samuelson and Barnett, 2007, p. 154). The 
working method of Newcomb and Samuelson was the same: to reproduce application of 
mathematical methods in physics to economics. Samuelson was not a physicist but he “had an 
acquaintanceship with scores of leading world mathematicians and physicists” and received 
“essential hints” for his work from a thermodynamicist19 (Ibid., p. 155). This working method 
is a caricature of the Newtonian method: “Samuelson’s signature method of economic theory, 
illustrated in his Foundations (1947), seems to follow two rules which can also be said to 
characterize much of Neoclassical economics since then: With every economic problem, (1) 
reduce the number of variables and keep only minimum set of simple economic relations; and  
(2) if possible, rewrite it as a constrained optimization problem” (Ibid., p. 144); “By 
modelling economic agents in this way, he hoped to be able to predict their behaviour in much 
the same way that physicists predicted the behaviour of physical objects” (Szenberg, 
Gottesman and Rarattan, 2005, p. 21).   
 In my opinion, it is the comparative easiness of Newcomb-Samuelson’s version of 
working on papers for professional journals and teaching their type of economics which was 
one of the important causes of the final victory of their current of economic thought over 
interpretive/historical institutionalism in economics. As I already mentioned before, 
interpretive/historical institutionalist version of teaching economics, by the involvement of 
students in research concerning burning socio-economic-political problems, requires from 
professors much more efforts than just repeating without no very great changes quite simple 
mathematical constructions and supervising solution by students of numerical examples 
illustrating these constructions. Those university graduates with good mathematical 
background, who are looking for a job valorising their mathematical skills and having value 
system of craftsmen rather than altruist investigators, could be very much attracted by the 
profession of academic economists in its neoclassical version. As a result of the fact that 
representatives of the profession who tried to make research concerning burning socio-
economic-political problems were persecuted (I will onto this topic below), by powerful 
forces from outside of the profession, the profession became unattractive for “altruist 
investigators”. As a consequence, “craftsmen” became majority in the profession of academic 
economists and could then control its neoclassical purity without frequent punitive sanctions 
(coming, for example, from members of university boards of regents) towards dissidents. 
According to Berger and Luckmann in this case the institutionalisation is successful.  
 
 For Newcomb “rational or scientific method” was mathematics, and Ely’s brochure 
was viewed by him as exclusively a “wholesale attack upon the introduction of any scientific 
method in economics”. Apparently he did not pay attention to the following statements of the 
brochure: “Young German professors of the Historical School <…> studies the present in the 
light of the past. They adopted experience as a guide, and judged of what was to come by 
what has been. Their method may also be called experimental. It is in many respects the same 
which has borne such excellent fruit in physical science <…> These men claimed that the 
whole life of the world had necessarily been a series of grand economic experiments, which 
having been described with more or less accuracy and completeness, it was possible to 
examine <...> It is on this account that a knowledge of history is absolutely essential to the 
political economist <…> it is impossible to comprehend the economic life of to-day without 
regard to the past” (Ely, 1884, pp. 43 – 46)  It is necessary to be autistic to evaluate the above 
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statements as “the general objections of the public against the value of theoretical science”. 
Newcomb made calculations in the field of astronomy which study quite simple system, and 
the mechanistic view of the world was sufficient for his work. However this view becomes 
totally inappropriate in the study of more complex natural systems. He did not know and did 
not understand it
20. What was determining in Newcomb’s attacks on Ely: his world view as a 
scholar or his political beliefs? I suppose the latter was decisive. In his popular publications, 
he “took a stern line in favour of rugged individualism in opposition to the ‘fallacies’ of 
labour unionism” (Blaug, 1986, p. 177). Certainly Newcomb could not like Ely’s evaluation 
of classical political economy as a partisan ideological construction: “Privileged classes, 
especially captains of industry, found in classicism a rational for their exploitation and 
freedom from regulation. According to orthodox canons, assistance to economic unfortunates 
interfered with natural law. The labourer received exactly what he deserved” (Rader, 1966, p. 
41 - 42). Apparently it is for this kind of discourse that Newcomb denounced Ely as unfit to 
hold a University Chair (Blaug, 1986, p. 177). John Hopkins University, based on the German 
model, could not very much protect its professor Ely from the attacks of those who did not 
wish the existence of experimentally-based economic research in the United States. 
 The antagonism between Ely and Newcomb lasted at least  two years (1885 and 1886). 
It was accompanied by attacking each other in papers at seminars and by publication of 
mutually critical articles in journals. It was a time when in American research universities a 
hostile coexistence between theology-like and research oriented currents of economists’ 
profession was yet possible. The institutionalisation of American economics has just started 
and punitive sanctions from outside of the profession were necessary to orient it in favour of 
the ruling class. Ely became subjected to this kind of sanctions in 1894 when he already 
worked in Wisconsin University. Concerned by the social question, as his German teachers,  
Ely could not be indifferent to its aggravation. He remembered: “In 1894 the nation was in the 
throes of a depression; unemployment and misery reached new heights; radical sentiment was 
rising” (Ely, 1938, p.218). Engaged in field studies Ely expressed his concern in his 
publications. It was used as a pretext by the Wisconsin’s State Superintendent of Education 
and a member of the University of Wisconsin’s Board of Regents, Oliver E. Wells, to provoke 
a real trial with participation of attorneys on behalf of the accusation (Wells) and the defence 
(Ely) in a special commission organised for this occasion [(Ely 1938, p. 218 – 233), (Rader 
1966, p. 130 – 158), (Schlabach, 1963 - 1964)]. Finally Ely has been acquitted but he became 
increasingly conservative in his opinions after surviving the accusation [Rutherford 2005, p. 
4]. As A.W. Coats indicates, “it is easy to understand why the shift of emphasis from teaching 
of established truths to the advancement of knowledge and the investigation of current 
problems was liable to generate frictions between the social scientists and certain segments of 
their audience” (1993 p. 439). He explained these frictions in the following way: “The late 
nineteenth century was a time of disturbing economic, social, and political tensions, and the 
fact that the business community was generally getting a bad press when the economists were 
undertaking more thorough studies of their activities increased the likelihood that even the 
most objective and impartial enquiries would furnish ammunition for the innumerable critics 
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of contemporary capitalism <…> Laissez-faire and conservative social Darwinism were still 
the ruling beliefs among members of the social and business elites, whereas many of the 
younger social scientists were reformers who regarded uninhibited individualism and 
unfettered competition as the cause of many , if not most, current economic and social evils 
<…> As might be expected, in some quarters such views were regarded as dangerously 
radical, and tensions mounted within the academic community as businessmen increasingly 
replaced clergymen on college and university boards of trustees” (Ibid., pp. 439 – 440).   
 The personality of Richard Ely can serve as an illustration of the connection which 
inevitably exists between values shared by an economist and methodology she/he is using. 
Experimental studies are very difficult and it is necessary to be very motivated in order to do 
them properly. For Newton and Boyle this motivation was linked with the idea that by their 
investigations they discover God’s design and in this way they approach themselves and 
human race to God. For such researchers as William Cunningham, Richard Ely and John 
Commons, Christian ideas also played a very important role in their professional orientations. 
All three of them besides their works reflecting their scientific investigations left us books in 
which they considered socio-politico-economic problems  from the point of view the 
Christian teaching [(Cunningham 1902, 1909), (Ely, 1889), (Commons, 1967)]. Ely was one 
of the leaders of the Social Gospel movement, a Protestant Christian intellectual movement  
which applied Christian ethics to social problems, especially towards poverty, inequality, 
liquor, crime, racial tensions, slums, bad hygiene, child labour, weak labour unions, poor 
schools, and the danger of war. Above all they opposed rampant individualism and called for 
a socially aware religion. Important concerns of the Social Gospel movement were labour 
reforms, such as abolishing child labour and regulating working hours for mothers. By 1920 
they were crusading against the 12-hour day for men at U.S.
21
. Experimental socio-economic 
studies are perhaps even more difficult in the domain of natural sciences and it is necessary to 
be very much motivated socially in order to do them properly. To my mind, some kind of 
altruism is absolutely necessary to someone engaged in social experimental research. 
Apparently not all Americans who got their PhD degrees in economics in Germany in the 
second half of the 19
th
 century had the needed level of altruism for experimental work. But 
the decisive factor forcing them to deviate from application of German research methodology 
was the hostile climate towards economic experimental research in general, and experimental 
research oriented to socio-economic reforms in particular, in most of the American 
universities due to their explicit or implicit control by business community. 
 The story
22
 of John Bates Clark (1847 –1938) represents maybe the most spectacular 
turnabout from institutionalism to neoclassicism (Fourcade, 2009, p. 81). From 1872 to 1875 
he attended the University of Zurich and the University of Heidelberg where he studied under 
Karl Knies. Upon his return to the United States, Clark taught economics, history and a whole 
series of other subjects at Carleton (where he taught Thorstein Veblen). After his return from 
1877 onward Clark published several articles most of them edited later in The Philosophy of 
Wealth (1886). Early in his career Clark's writings reflected the view of his German teachers 
that competition is no universal remedy – especially not for fixing wages. His view on fair 
wages changed in 1886. By the time he wrote The Distribution of Wealth (1899) he was 
convinced that pure competition was the natural and normal law by which the economic order 
obtained justice. One cause that prompted this reorientation could be the Haymarket Riot 
1886 in Chicago when some strikers were shot and others hanged – event still remembered 
the 1st of May worldwide outside the US. In the US it resulted in a cleansing of higher 
education from socialist reformers. In 1988, he wrote: “The science adapted … is economic 
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Darwinism. … Though the process was savage, the outlook which it afforded was not wholly 
evil. The survival of crude strength was, in the long run, desirable”. This was the fundament 
to develop the theory which made him famous: Given competition and homogeneous factors 
of production labor and capital, the repartition of the social product will be according to the 
productivity of the last physical input of units of labor and capital. In 1895, Clark finally won 
a position at Columbia University where he spent most of his career. In the history of 
American economics he is considered as neo-classical economist, one of the pioneers of the 
marginalist revolution and opponent to the Institutionalist school of economics. The John 
Bates Clark Medal, one of the most prestigious US-awards in the field of economics, was 
awarded in 1947 to Paul A. Samuelson whose textbook Economics divulged Clark’s capital 
concept worldwide. 
Stories of other American economists graduated from German universities are less 
grotesque than that of Clark but can help to understand why historical institutionalism had not 
very large ground in the USA. Among them Nelson Patten (1852-1922) who graduated from 
University of Halle in 1878 with a PhD in economics. It was Patten who connected Ely with 
Professor Conrad, and in this way involved Ely in the study of economics.  Patten found only 
disappointment upon his return to America. He worked on a farm for a year. He tried to study 
law in Chicago, but developed terrible eye troubles that prevented him from reading. After 
receiving a successful treatment for his eyes, he worked as a teacher in a district school and 
subsequently became superintendent of schools in Rhodes, Iowa. In the meantime, after his 
vision was restored, Patten began working on his first book “The Premises of Political 
Economy” which was published in 1886. The book was an adaptation of John Stuart Mill's 
thinking to fit the economic situation in America, and led to Patten's appointment to a position 
at Wharton School of Economics in University of Pennsylvania. He would remain at Wharton 
School until 1917 and made it the most influential centre of economic theory in the United 
States
23
. Another American receiving his doctorate in political economy from University of 
Halle (1877) was Edmund J. James (1855 — 1925). Upon his return to the United States he 
received an appointment as a high school principal. In 1883, James was appointed at the 
University of Pennsylvania as professor of public finance and administration. It was there that 
he became the director of Wharton School of Finance and Economy
24
.  Patten and James in 
1884 tried to organise in the United States something similar to Verein für Sozialpolitik, but 
failed (Ely, 1938, pp. 132 – 135). Neither Patten nor James contributed to the introduction of 
German historical school experimental tradition in the United States. 
Beginning from the mid-nineteenth-century Christianity inspired both camps of 
American economists, advocates of laissez-faire and its opponents. I already spoke of Social 
Gospel movement, but the opposite movement existed: “Members of so-called clerical school 
of academic economists <…> worked closely with a group of wealthy and prominent men of 
affairs. Their common goal was the installation of laissez-faire as an American system of 
economics” (Furner, 1975, p. 37).  After the Civil War they continued to develop the mid-
century economic synthesis which “was the joint creation of academics who domesticated 
English classical economics as a scientific substitute for moral philosophy and American 
businessmen who needed just such a rationale for the developing industrial economy” (Ibid., 
p. 36).  Perhaps the most prominent academic economist issued from the clergy was William 
Graham Summer (1840-1910), influential Yale professor and Social Darwinist. He defended 
radical laissez-faire as being justified by laws of evolution
25
. The influence of Summer was 
far more significant than that of Newcomb. As Ely, he studied in Germany, but theology and 
not economics. Leaning under the guidance of gifted theologians he grasped the meaning and 
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spirit of scholarship (Ibid., p. 43). After his return to America “Summer was ordained an 
Episcopal minister and actually preached for a few years in a stylish New York church” 
(Ibid.).  “Like many of his educated contemporaries, Summer wanted to study the economic 
and social problems of his day scientifically” and “in “Herbert Spencer’s Study of Sociology 
(1870), he found the model for an organic study of society which he had been seeking. 
“Resigning his clerical post, Summer became the first occupant of a chair in political 
economy and social science at Yale” (Ibid.).    
 The controversy with Newcomb has inspired Ely to organise the American Economic 
Association in 1885 in order to combat “the Summer-Newcomb crowd”. Simon Newcomb 
was already president of the Political Economy Club located in New York where conservative 
economists dominated. The Ely’s proposal for this association included the following 
statements: “While we recognise the necessity of individual initiative in industrial life, we 
hold that the doctrine laissez-faire is unsafe in politics and unsound in morals; and it suggests 
an inadequate explanation of the relation between the State and citizens <…> we believe that 
political economy is still in the first stages of its development, and we look not so much to 
speculation as to an impartial study of actual condition of economic life for the satisfactory 
accomplishment of that development <…> We hold that the conflict of labour and capital has 
brought to the front a vast number of social problems whose solution is impossible without 
the united efforts of Church, State, and Science” (Rader, 1966, p. 35). He wanted an 
organisation not just for a mutual interchange of economic ideas but for publicising and 
implementing a social reform program. Many participants of the organisational meeting did 
not support a platform aimed directly at reform (Ibid., pp. 35 – 37).  In spite of Ely’s efforts 
during many years as secretary of the AEA, it was finally transformed in a British-like 
association. The continuation and very successful development in the United States of the 
scientific economic tradition born in Germany under the form of Wisconsin Institutionalism 
was due to an extraordinary combination of circumstances:  move of R. Ely, and later of one 
of his students, John Commons, to Wisconsin where political will of the governor/senator 
Robert La Follette, supported by the President Theodore Roosevelt, created very favourable 
institutional conditions for experimentally-based economic research in the University of 
Wisconsin. These institutional conditions received the name of the “Wisconsin Idea”. In spite 
of the great national socio-economic-political impact of the Wisconsin Institutionalism, its 
institutional model (rules of producing knowledge in the discipline of economics and teaching 
students specialised in this discipline) remained an isolated island where German approach to 
economics was adopted in the sea of traditional British-like university model. That is why I 
will jump here Wisconsin Institutionalism; I will come back to it in the following section of 
this paper, and will try to mention very shortly some decisive factors which oriented the 
itinerary of institutional evolution of the discipline of economics in the United States.   
 As Mary O. Furner (1975) has shown, the most decisive factor in the evolution of 
American economics at the turn of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries was a political one. She 
indicated that academic economists were subject to an increasing “external control (such as 
boards of trustees and university administrators, or state legislatures in the case of public 
universities)” dissuading them from working in favour of social reforms. I already mentioned 
below in this paper political attacks on Richard Ely, but he was not alone: “During the wave 
of academic freedom cases that spanned from the 1890s to the 1910s, many economists came 
under sharp public attack for promoting views that offended powerful constituencies in 
matters as varied as the labour movement, free silver coinage, public utility franchises, or 
fiscal policy” (Fourcade, 2009, p. 79). This type of political attacks “drove them to confine 
their scholarship to ‘safe’ intellectual grounds”. Neoclassical economics and especially in its 
mathematical form was ideal for serving such ground. That is the reason why it became an 
“attractive research strategy by American economists, especially by the younger generations 
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who had to create a position for themselves” (Ibid., pp. 79 – 80). The purely political and 
economic interests behind these attacks were camouflaged by the falsifying discourse of the 
necessity of the switch from “advocacy” to “objectivity”. This switch meant in reality the 
refuse from studying objectively reality in order to solve some burning socio-politico-
economic problems in favour of studying constructed abstract imaginary worlds legitimating 
the status quo and avoiding any touch with disturbing matters for the establishment. 
 Other factors, linked with the first one, influencing the institutional evolution of the 
discipline of economics in the United States were the demise of the Social Gospel movement 
and the use of the image of science to legitimate conservative opinions (Bateman, 1998). The 
discourse of Social Gospel movement concerning religion, social justice, and welfare was 
substituted by the discourse of conservative economists about science, efficiency, and free 
enterprise. “Not all American economists in 1920 would have happily identified with the 
whole range of Ely’s and Commons’s work <…> but in the glow of the Social Gospel’s 
golden years, historical and institutional approaches were accepted and respected” (Ibid. p. 
41). These acceptance and respect disappeared, or at least decreased, with the switch from the 
image of science as experimental activity to purely theoretical one, in which just the fact of 
using mathematics already signifies its scientific character: “Whereas institutional economics 
seemed perfectly ‘scientific’ in 1922, by 1947, it was no longer unquestionably regarded as 
such” (Ibid., p. 48). Academic freedom in the case of the discipline of economics is very 
relative: “During the twentieth century, there have been primarily four patrons of economics: 
higher education, the government, the business community, and charitable foundations” 
(Goodwin, 1998, p. 54). Practically all of them contributed, including by the selective 
financing, to the gradual diminution of the weight of any current of economic thought 
different from neoclassical and considered as troublemaking (Ibid., pp. 78 – 79). Finally, 
because very close interaction between community of economists and community of 
mathematicians, evolution of economics was more influenced by the internal tendencies in the 
development of mathematics than by the changing economic reality with its burning problems 
(Weintraub, 2002). Thus the reign of neoclassical economics and its transformation into the 
mainstream cannot be considered to be due to its scientific superiority. The result of this 
evolution is disappointing. Surveys of PhD students in USA universities (Colander and 
Klamer, 1990), (Colander, 2007) show “a picture of a profession lost in pure theory and 
technicalities with little focus on ideas. There was a sense that economics dealt with mind 
games, not real economics problems” (Ibid., p. 9).  It is just a confirmation of the evaluation 
of Ariel Rubinstein given in the third section of this paper: the contemporary economics has a 
character of a set of “fables” which has “very little to say about the real world and that there 
are very few models in economic theory that can be used to provide serious advice”.  
 Contemporary economists are either Philosophers/Mathematicians with their a priori 
method or Econometricians/Statisticians trying to make explanation and/or forecasting on the 
basis of purely quantitative models and data. German and American interpretative/historical 
institutionalists worked more like Anthropologists/Historians who used interviews, 
participant observation, action research and different types of analysis of qualitative and 
quantitative historical data.  The latter mode to work requires particular professional values. 
My long participant observations in departments of economics of Russian and French 
universities, as well as my experience of communication with members of communities of 
academic economists throughout the world, allow me to propose the following typology of 
academic economists from the point of view of their professional values: 
1. Economist - university teacher/researcher has to study the reality in order to understand it, 
and in this way to be useful to the society by transferring to it, in particular to his students, 
this understanding. This cognitive activity itself represents for him a passion, and material 
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reward for this activity has a secondary importance. I call this type of economist an Altruist 
Investigator. This type corresponds to the Fichte’s notion of the vocation of the scholar. 
2. The profession of academic economist is just a profession as any others. In a profession, to 
do your work properly means to respond to expectations of your employers, clients and 
colleagues. The academic economist produces theoretical constructions, beauty of which 
brings him satisfaction only in case of a good rewarding of his productive activities. I call this 
type of economist a Craftsman. 
3. Academic economist has to survey carefully which directions of scientific production are in 
fashion, allow getting grants, welcomed in professional journals, conferences and seminars. 
He has to orient and organise his research activity (writing and presentation of papers) in such 
a way that it allows him to better “sell” results of his scientific production. By adopting the 
term used by Marion Fourcade (2009), I call this type of economist a Merchant.  
 The table below shows compatibility of certain methodologies with certain values. It 
gives an additional explanation why interpretive/institutional current of American economics 
has disappeared. When the community of economists is created as a community of 
“craftsmen” and “merchants”, an “altruist investigator” will never survive in this community. 
The rules instituted for “craftsmen” and “merchants” will never fit to him.  
 
 
  Type of academic economist from the point of view of her/his 
professional values 
Type of academic economist from the point 
of view of applied in her/his work 
methodology 
 
Altruist investigator 
 
Craftsman 
 
Merchant 
Philosopher/Mathematician   X X 
Econometrician/Statistician   X X 
Anthropologist/Historian  X X  
 
Table 1. Compatibility of shared professional values and used methodology 
 
 At present the American institution of economics is based not only on the false idea of 
science inherited from modernity, but also on the neoliberal vision of any human activity. The 
contemporary American institution of economics is constructed on the ideas that the 
neoclassical economics proclaims itself transforming the community of economists into a 
market place. Each member of the community is “selling” her/his products (papers intended 
for publication in professional economic journals) to its powerful members present in 
different committees and boards and receiving in exchange evaluations necessary for 
obtaining different resources like permanent and temporary university positions and grants. 
The institutionalisation of this type of economics was very successful, it means that it does 
not require frequent sanctions of deviators for its stable functioning. It became possible 
because several generations of economists were “processed” by the institutionalisation to 
maintain economics in the prescribed framework and after that, the probability of dissidence 
is very low.  
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6. Institution of economics and institutional economics   
 
The history of economics suggests that 
survival has often depended upon the ability of 
doctrine to fit in with the habits of thought of 
the times. If the next decade demands formal 
value theory that avoids a discussion of what 
the economic order is like, institutional 
economics will fail. If it demands an 
understanding of our relationship to the world 
in which we live, it will survive.  
                            (Walton H. Hamilton, 1919, p. 318) 
 
 
 British-type institution of economics took its legitimatisation in the ideas produced by 
modernity
26
. Now it became clear that the origins of modernity were theological (Gillespie, 
2008).  One of the main ideas of modernity was universally applied dualism. It is ironical that 
they often connect the beginning of modernity with Copernican revolution; however 
Copernicus destroyed the false duality Earth-Havens, which was very important for the 
Church, but modernity, taking its inspiration in theology, created many others dichotomies 
such as subject-object, fact-value, theory-practice, appearance-essence. Modernity is in many 
respects reflected by Cartesianism
27
.  
 
 
                                                       Research object 
 
 
 
 
                         Idealism                                             Empiricism   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        Ideas/theories                                      Researcher             
                                                        Rationalism 
                   
Fig. 1. The old (modernist) model of scientific research  
                                                 
26
 “Modernity is a term that refers to the modern era <…> in different contexts, refers to cultural and intellectual 
movements of the period  1630-1940.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modernity 
27
 Descartes was a real personification of modernity:  “Cartesianism destroyed the balance which underlies true 
science: the balance between thinking and observing, deduction and induction, imagination and common sense, 
reflection and action, reason and passion, abstract thinking and realism, the world within and the world without 
the mind. Under the impact of Cartesianism the second element of the equation was sacrificed to the first <...> 
Descartes’ epistemological reflections opened an era of axiomatic, unhistorical, deductive thinking broadly 
called the Enlightenment.” (Mini, 1994, p. 39) The Cartesian dualism with its separation of knowing from doing, 
object from subject, fact from value, theory from practice serves an epistemological foundation for neoclassical 
economics (Bush, 1993, p. 65).  
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 According to the dualistic tradition, mutually excluding doctrines were developed such 
as empiricism-rationalism and materialism-idealism. For a century and a half, economics 
claims to be a science having natural sciences as a model. It used in this claim the modernist 
model of scientific research. Modernist model is based on the sharp separation of (research) 
object and subject (researcher), as well as on an individualistic vision of the process of 
scientific research. Elements of this model are: Research object, Researcher and 
Ideas/Theories. Empiricism considers the links between these elements in following way: 
Research object → Researcher → Ideas/Theories. Rationalism linked them differently: 
Researcher  → Ideas/Theories  → Research object.  Comte’s  positivism hesitated between 
these two visions of scientific research which allowed John S. Mill to announce political 
economy an abstract and only abstract science. Idealism saw the sequence of elements in a 
third way: Ideas/Theories → Research object → Researcher. Materialism turned the direction 
of arrows in the opposite way. In spite of all these differences, all these “isms” appealed to the 
same modernist model of scientific research. The use of such metaphors as “law”, 
“mechanism” and “organism” is also very characteristic of Modernity. The former has 
religious and political origins: Ancient Testament and Absolutism. It is this metaphor which 
oriented Positivism in a wrong direction. Classical physics appealed to mechanism. Finally, 
the last characteristic, but apparently the most important feature of modernist model of 
scientific research, was its individualism: the researcher was alone in his search of truth as a 
copy of reality. It is the modernist model of scientific research which is at the basis of the so 
called “scientific method”, which is often presented as hypothetic-deductive method.   
 Charles S. Peirce was the first to make a flaw in the modernist model of scientific 
research. He saw the research as a collective action of investigators who, by observing and by 
analysing something separately, gradually converge on the results of investigation. The 
pragmatist philosophy of Peirce, according to his own words, corresponds to the 
experimentalist’s mind (Peirce, 1905, pp. 331, 332)28.  His understanding of science was very 
close to that of Latour and Knorr Cetina: “What is Science? We cannot define the word with 
precision and concision with which we define Circle or Equation, any more than we can so 
define Money, Government, Stone, Life. The idea, like these, and more than some of them, is 
too vastly complex and diversified; It embodies the epitome of man’s intellectual 
development … a particular branch of science, such as Physical Chemistry or Mediterranean 
Archeology, is no mere word, manufactured by the authority of some academic pedant, but a 
real object, being the very concrete life of a social group constituted by real facts of inter-
relation”. (Quoted by Mirowski (1987, p. 1009). The next step in the destruction of  modernist 
model of scientific research was made by Thomas Kuhn with his understanding of scientific 
revolutions (1970). Paul Feyerabend also contributed to this destruction by his attack against 
the identification of scientific character with a particular ‘scientific method’ (1978). At last, 
the social constructivism (Berger and Luckmann, 1991) provided a building material with the  
help of which it became possible to create a new model of scientific research, much more 
realist than modernist,.  
Bruno Latour and other specialists of Science Studies have shown that the modernist 
type of discourse never corresponded to the realities of scientific research: “We have never 
been modern” (Latour, 1997). They switched from the discourse around a modernist model of 
scientific research to a new model of scientific research, the elaboration of which has been 
                                                 
28
 An experimentalist “has had his mind molded in the laboratory <…> With intellects of widely different 
training from his own, whose education has largely been a thing learned out of books, he will never become 
inwardly intimate, be he on ever so familiar terms with them; for he and they are as oil and water, and though 
they be shaken up together, it is remarkable how quickly they will go their several mental ways, without having 
gained more than a faint flavor from the association.”  (Peirce, 1905, p.331) 
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based on historical and field studies of scientific practices in natural sciences (Latour and 
Woolgar, 1979).  
 
 
   Experimental situation 
                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Community of evaluators                         Ideas/theories                                 
 
                     Fig. 2. The new (Bruno Latour’s) model of scientific research  
 
Bruno Latour rejects the modernist model with all its dichotomies and “isms”. In his 
model of scientific research the Research object is not separated from the Researcher, but make 
together with researcher and her/his “instruments” an experimental situation, and ideas and 
theories coming from observations/experiments are evaluated not by the individual researcher 
but by a community of evaluators consisting not only of members of the corresponding 
scientific community but of a larger community which includes administrators, politicians and 
concerned segments of the public. Evaluators can be divided in two categories: witnesses and 
judges. Difference between them consists in their respective roles in the procedure of 
evaluation: the former only express their opinion about evaluated ideas/theories, but the latter, 
taking into consideration these opinions, make decisions concerning destiny of ideas/theories 
and future of experimental situation itself. Most of the members of scientific communities, 
except powerful members, belong to the category of witnesses. This model does not challenge 
the objectivity of scientific research and does not lead to relativism. It allows to change totally 
the discourse about science and to turn it from absolutely sterile "what ought to be" to the 
direction of “what is”.  
I give here my own interpretation of the model of scientific research proposed by 
Latour
29
. As I already mentioned earlier, according to Latour, the specificity of scientific 
research does not consist in a special “scientific method”, but in the design of experimental 
situation in which the object has the possibility to resist, “to object” to the ideas of the 
researcher concerning it, “when things strike back” (Latour, 2000). Application of this model 
to economics leads to the interpretive/pragmatic paradigm (interpretive/pragmatic institutional 
economics) resulting in the switch from primarily theoretical (a priori) type of research to 
experimental type of research, and from primarily quantitative techniques to qualitative 
methods. Analysis of historical data (basically texts: laws, political discourses, etc.), 
interviews, focus groups and action research should become the core of economics research. 
This mode of research can bring valuable results only if the research is organized in such a 
                                                 
29
 To my mind, the Figure 2 and my comments to it, correctly reflect Latour’s ideas; however I am the only one 
responsible for this interpretation.  
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way that the research object can resist to the ideas issued by the researcher about it. It is this 
kind of resistance which has permitted to economists of the New German Historical School 
and Wisconsin Institutionalism to come to the understanding of socio-economic-political 
processes in their countries, and elaborate on this bases propositions and legislative acts for 
the solution of the so-called “social  question” at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.  
 In section 3 of this paper I gave a description of the German institution of economics, 
which was created under the leadership of Schmoller collaborating very closely with the 
government of Bismarck. Institution of economics in the form of Wisconsin Institutionalism 
was in many respects similar to the German one. The role of Schmoller was played by John R. 
Commons working very closely with the administration of the governor/senator of the state of 
Wisconsin, Robert La Follette. In Wisconsin, the German model has even been improved: in 
addition to historical and monographic research, researchers began to use a technique which 
was later called Action Research.  It was made under the form of the Wisconsin Industrial 
Commission, which served as a laboratory for the Commons’s group where they made their 
investigations. Story of Wisconsin Institutionalism, which I will tell shortly here, shows the 
practical possibility and very high efficiency of the Commons’s type institutional research.  
 The favourable conditions for the start of the Wisconsin Institutionalism began to be 
created with the move in 1892 of Richard Ely from John Hopkins to Wisconsin. In spite of his 
many concessions, “Ely’s position at John Hopkins had never been fully secure” (Rader,  
1966, p. 107). Ely has received an appointment in the University of Wisconsin where he 
worked as professor and director of the School of Economics, Political Science and History 
until 1925. When Ely came to Wisconsin, La Follette greeted him with the remark: “You have 
been my teacher!” Ely wrote in his memoirs: “He has never been my student, but what he 
meant was that he had got a great deal out of my writings. I was never his close adviser, but I 
saw him frequently; often he was a guest at my house as I was at his <…> When I was 
attacked bitterly, in an attempt to oust me from Wisconsin, he said he would take the stump in 
my behalf before he would allow my enemies to prevail” (Ely, 1938, p. 216). Ely succeeded 
to introduce in his school the spirit of German Humboldtian universities where teaching was 
realised by the involvement of students in the research process. In the case of economic 
domain, it meant the involvement in the understanding of the real economic practice:  “My 
experience in Germany had first brought to my attention the importance of linking book 
knowledge and practical experience” (Ibid., p. 187).  
The start of the Wisconsin Institutionalism can be marked by the arrival in 1904 in 
Wisconsin of the former Ely’s student, John R. Commons. The latter decided to become Ely’s 
student in John Hopkins after reading publications in the press attacking him (Commons, 
1964, p. 40), and later (around 1888) he was fascinated by the “new” (originated in Germany) 
political economy taught by Professor Ely (Ibid., p. 44). He joined the University of 
Wisconsin’s economic department at a particularly favourable time, when the state 
government and the administration of the university were controlled by the advocates of 
social reforms: “In Wisconsin Commons found himself an insider whose talents were useful 
to those in power, where elsewhere he had been considered a dangerous radical. He could 
continue to engage in reform activities in Wisconsin, but he did so for the authorities instead 
of in spite of them” (Harter, 1962, p. 45).  It was Commons and his students, rather than Ely, 
who really made Wisconsin institutionalism
30: “Commons was a leader in the Wisconsin Idea, 
that is, the movement that brought experts from the university faculty into partnership with 
state government policymakers” (Lampman, 1993, p. 27). The economic research oriented to 
reform culminates in proposal for institutional change. Finally these proposals take the form 
of legislative acts. Unlike German economists who advised civil servants in drafting 
                                                 
30
 The above described analysis of Wisconsin Institutionalism has to a great extent been borrowed from 
(Rutherford, 2006).  
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legislative acts, Wisconsin institutionalists (Commons and his students) were directly 
involved in drafting laws. Commons himself participated in drafting the Civil Service Law of 
1906, and the Public Utility Act of 1907.  Later his students, such as Edwin E. Witte and Paul 
A. Raushenbush, took the relay. Witte’s PhD dissertation was concerned with the role of the 
government in labour disputes (Witte, 1932). He became the real father of the Social Security 
in the United States (Schlabach, 1969). Raushenbush had played a crucial role in the 
development of the US unemployment compensation legislation (Raushenbush & 
Raushenbush, 1979). As Philip Mirowski wrote: “Many of the economic functions of the US 
government that we take for granted today were the handiwork of Commons and his students 
in the first half of the twentieth century” (Mirowski, 1987, p. 1027)31.   
Ely transmitted to Commons the Humboldtian method of university teaching; by the 
involvement of students in the research process. Ely has witnessed that no man has been more 
successful than professor Commons in carrying out this idea: “He kept in touch, on one hand, 
with labour, and on the other, with the management of industry. He mingled with all classes 
of people. He introduced to his classes people <…>, who were regarded as very dangerous 
radicals. To him, these people were simply human representatives, whom his students should 
known face to face. On the other hand, he was just as eager to have his classes know 
capitalists and leaders of industry. He could admire a labour leader; he could understand the 
slugger; and he had a great admiration for the big industrial leaders. In order to understand 
their point of view, he became a member of the Wisconsin Industrial Commission, while on a 
leave of absence from his university duties” (Ely, 1938, pp. 187 – 188). It is worthwhile to 
mention here that, as we saw below in section 4 of this paper, Alfred Marshall, at the 
beginning of his career, had intentions to contact closely similar persons in England but he did 
not implement it following advise of “older and wiser” people from his social environment 
and realising that such type of research would take too much time and efforts. In this way 
Marshall had not become “Anthropologist/Historian” but had stayed as his predecessors, 
English political economists, “Philosopher”, adding to it a mathematical style: a 
“Philosopher/Mathematician”.  It became inevitable because his value system was much 
closer to a “Craftsman” than to an “Altruist investigator”.  
Commons was certainly an “Altruist investigator”. He preferred individual and small 
group research sessions to lectures: ”He did lectures and he often gave talks to large groups, 
but his success came from his marshalling of facts and from his enthusiasm for what he was 
advocating” (Harter, 1962, p. 77). This is the testimony of his student Edwin Witte: “He 
[Professor Commons] inspired his students to devote their lives to the improvement of our 
democratic way of life and our economy of free enterprise, for which he developed in them 
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 The President Theodore Roosevelt characterised the achievements in Wisconsin in the following way: “The 
Thanks to the movement for genuinely democratic popular government which Senator La Follette led to 
overwhelming victory in Wisconsin, that state has become literally a laboratory for wise experimental legislation 
aiming to secure the social and political betterment of the people as a whole <…> All through the Union we 
need to learn the Wisconsin lesson of scientific popular self-help, and of patient care in radical legislation. The 
American people have made up their minds that there is to be a change for the better in their political, their 
social, and their economic conditions; and the prime need of the present day is practically to develop the new 
machinery necessary for this new task. It is no easy matter actually to insure, instead of merely talking about, a 
measurable equality of opportunity for all men. It is no easy matter to make this Republic genuinely an industrial 
as well as a political democracy. It is no easy matter to secure justice for those who in the past have not received 
it, and at the same time to see that no injustice is meted out to others in the process. It is no easy matter to keep 
the balance level and make it evident that we have set our faces like flint against seeing this government turned 
into either government by a plutocracy, or government by a mob. It is no easy matter to give the public their 
proper control over corporations and big business, and yet to prevent abuse of that control. Wisconsin has 
achieved a really remarkable success along each and every one of those lines of difficult endeavor.” (McCarthy, 
1912, pp. 2-3) 
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not only profound admiration, but also an appreciation that American idea is one of 
continuous progress. As is common with young people, many of Commons’ students were 
dissatisfied with things as they are. But they emerged from his classes, indeed, as men who 
wanted to improve what they thought was wrong, but without destroying our political, 
economic, and social structure. Commons taught them to see that they must thoroughly know 
the facts and offer workable proposals for improvements. He told them not only to study all 
that was written about a given subject, and to reason logically about it, but to make their own 
observations, and to think in terms of remedies, rather than criticisms, and to learn from the 
people directly interested” (Harter, 1962). This testimony shows that Commons totally 
corresponded to the vocation of the scholar as it had been determined by Fichte. It also shows 
how an alternative to the present mode of teaching could be organised in university 
departments of economics.  The involvement of graduate students by Commons in projects of 
reform was a very efficient teaching method: “Instead of working on the usual projects, which 
are often destined to dusty shelves, they worked on reforms that in many cases became laws. 
It was easy for them to feel the importance of what they were doing. Consequently, their work 
took on an urgency that drew from them considerably more effort than they otherwise might 
have given” (Harter, 1962, p. 78).  
John Commons called interviewing “the prime method of investigation” (1934a, 
p.106). He practised extensively case studies of the past, for example the Slaughter House 
Cases (1924, pp. 47 - 54), and of the present. The latter was investigated by him as a member 
of the Wisconsin State Industrial Commission (1934b, pp. 142, 143). He wrote: “Academic 
teaching is merely brains without experience. The ‘practical’ extreme is experience without 
brains. One is half-baked philosophy – the other is rule-of-thumb” (1934c, p.160). German 
economists understood it very well, but Commons has enriched the set of techniques of the 
economist “Anthropologist/Historian” by adding to interviewing and archive work, 
participant observation and action research. His student, Elizabeth Brandeis Raushenbush, 
remembered: “Commons was certainly an all-purpose labour economist, because he did the 
most important fundamental research, the documentary history of labour <…> although he 
deserved his academic reputation, the reason his students distinguished themselves and were 
so prominent in various areas was because he soon involved them in current labour economic 
problems. He wanted them to have research tools and to know what they were doing. It was 
not research for the sake of research. Perhaps there were some people who continued to work 
in the history of labour and felt there plenty more to do there; but most of his students did 
research for the purpose of using it in the various battles to improve things, in what we now 
call ‘action research’” (Raushenbush & Raushenbush, 1979, p. 9). Commons established 
himself as one of the leading American labour economists, recognition coming with his 
election as President of the American Economics Association in 1917. 
Commons supervised or co-supervised to completion forty-six PhD students during his 
Wisconsin career. It is Commons and his students that did most of the teaching in the 
economics department of the University of Wisconsin. Commons offered a course based 
mainly on the study of reported legal cases, involving a correlation of law, economics and 
psychology. In the 1928/29 year, Paul Raushenbush taught an undergraduate course 
Economic Institutions. Raushebush himself described this course as dealing with the social 
control of business (Ibid., p. 4). The course Labour Legislation (Witte and Brandeis) focused 
on  government action in relation to labour,  protective legislation and its constitutionality, 
collective bargaining and its legal status, and Wisconsin legislation and the work of the 
Wisconsin Industrial Commission. Brandeis used to get her students to attend hearings and 
legislative sessions, and to follow the progress of bills dealing with labour issues (Ibid., 15). 
A special course on Technique of Field Investigation was also available to students. “There 
cannot have been very many, if any, other professors of economics in the US over the period 
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Commons was at Wisconsin who produced as many graduate students, or whose students had 
such a marked impact on government legislation and policy. In this sense Commons and his 
students were extremely successful
32
. What, then, happened to Wisconsin institutionalism, and 
why did its particular type of economics and economic education suffer a decline in the years 
that followed?” (Rutherford, 2006).  I suppose that the answer to this question is already given 
in the previous section of this paper:  
- a generally negative attitude of businessmen when researchers try by field studies to 
understand what is going on within their enterprises;   
- the encouragement and support by businessmen and politicians depending on them to 
those economists who advocate laissez-faire in their theoretical constructions and 
teaching
33
;  
- much harder work of “Anthropologists/Historians” in comparison with “Philosophers/ 
Mathematicians”;  
- communication difficulties of the functioning of communities of academic economists 
“Anthropologists/Historians” (their theoretical constructions are not universal, but 
contextual);  
- and last but not the least, deeply enrooted views of Modernity in  the Western culture.   
Wisconsin Institutionalism gives us a concept on what kind of change is necessary for the 
institution of economics in order to transform economics in a real science which could bring 
as tangible effects as natural science does. 
The research and reforming activity of Commons was financially supported by the big 
business. In 1906, he participated in the study of some thirty-five municipally and privately 
owned gas, electric light and power, and street railroad companies in the United States and 
England. As part of the study, he made a five-month trip to the British Isles. (Harter, 1962, 
p. 72) This study was made for the National Civic Federation financed by the big business. 
This Federation was involved in elaborating and lobbing, at state and at federal levels, laws 
concerning public insurance of unemployment, federal regulation of trade and enterprises of 
public utilities
34
. Later Commons, with several of his students, undertook the supervision of 
the labour portion of one of the surveys financed by the Russell Sage Foundation (Ibid.). In 
1907, Commons has been elected as the secretary of the American Association for Labour 
Legislation, which was financed by Rockefeller and Morgan.  This organisation was involved 
in elaborating legislation concerning enterprises of public utilities, minimum wages, 
maximum working hours, and laws in favour of trade unions. In my opinion, the big business 
supported Commons in these activities because it was interested to resolve the social question 
and to prevent worsening of class conflicts. When the task of social reform had been fulfilled, 
the big business has lost interest to institutional research. And that is the reason why the 
extension of this type of research to other areas such as banking and financial regulation did 
not happen. Institutional research in the United States by “Anthropologists/Historians” 
became a local and temporary episode, the existence of which was due to extraordinary 
circumstances. The forecast of Walton H. Hamilton, author of the term “institutional 
economics”, which I put as epigraph to this section of this paper, has been totally realised.  
The received view that institutional economics of John R. Commons is something 
absolutely inacceptable for contemporary academic economists is dominant. This view unites 
very different representatives of the community of economists. The school of thought 
launched by Schmoller and Commons is often accused to create no theories as neo-classical 
economists do
35
.  Mainstream economists try in vain to find in texts of Commons deductive 
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 The marking is mine (VY). 
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 See (Furner, 1975).  
34
 See the article of Murray N. Rothbard (2006) at http://mises.org/story/2225 . 
35
 See for example section on American institutionalism of Mark Blaug’s book (1985). 
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theories based on a priori axioms: “The institutionalists seem to have suffered from a 
methodological confusion regarding the nature of theory. They thought a description was a 
theory.” (Ward, 1966, p. 187); “Theory was never Commons’s metier. When he calls his 
‘theories’ are exclusively poorly wrought and somewhat lackadaisical classifications and sub-
classifications of phenomena as they appear to him from the dimly held and mainly intuitive 
conception impossible to define.” (Seckler, 1975, p 124). Geoffrey Hodgson who has the 
modernist vision of institutional economics has been trapped in the same way: “Commons did 
not have the statute of a major theorist such as Alfred Marshall or Karl Marx. Furthermore, he 
did not have the aptitude for careful definitions or logical chains of reasoning” (Hodgson, 
2003, p. 548). The following evaluation of Douglass North could be due to a 
misunderstanding or ignorance: “The problem with institutional economics, and the reason it 
faded from sight, was that it did not explicitly address the issues we had to solve. What we 
have to do is understand what makes economies work the way they do – that is a necessary 
precondition to being able to say something about how we can make them work better.” 
(North, 2003, p.1)The following statement looks invalid in the light of the exposed above 
Latour’s model of scientific research and enumerated earlier five factors influencing the 
decline of the Commonsian institutionalism  : “In the interwar period institutionalism was 
actually the dominant school of economic thought in the US. It lost ground to neoclassical 
formalism partly because it neglected its own task of underlying theoretical development. It is 
not difficult to see how institutionalism became bogged down. After establishing the 
importance of institutions, routines and habits, it underlined the value of largely descriptive 
work on the nature and function of politico-economic institutions. Whilst this was of value it 
became the predominant and almost exclusive practice of institutionalist writers. The 
institutionalists became data-gatherers par excellence. The error here was largely 
methodological and epistemological, and committed by many institutionalists with the 
exception of Veblen himself and few others. It was a crucial mistake simply to clamour for 
descriptive ‘realism’, by gathering more and more data, or by painting a more and more 
detailed picture of particular economic institutions” (Hodgson, 1988, pp. 21 – 22). I will come 
to some of Hodgson’s statements in the next section of the paper. Now, it is sufficient to say 
that he unfortunately is caught in a net of modernist model of scientific research.  
 The conclusion, that we can make on the basis of what has been said above in this 
section of the paper, is following: the American institution of economics of British origin had 
killed the American institutional economics coming from the German tradition
36
. It happened 
because the British-type institution of economics, for the reasons exposed above, became 
dominant. Nevertheless after this death, which happened before Wold War II, the label 
“institutional economics” is actively used in the community of academic economists 
throughout the world.. Among them it is easy to distinguish advocates of Thorstein Veblen 
and advocates of Ronald H. Coase. Both types of “institutionalists” work in the modernist 
framework and that is why they can professionally survive under the existing institution of 
economics. The advocates of Veblen are to a great extent marginalised, and can exist 
primarily in such professional niches as methodology of economics and/or history of 
economic thought. On the contrary advocates of Coase prosper, becoming an influential part 
of the mainstream.  
I indicated earlier that Commons, as a student of Ely, was fascinated by the new 
German economics and has learned a lot of his professor about how to make research and 
teaching. Veblen attended Ely’s course only for one term and left  John Hopkins for Yale. 
There is a testimony that “Veblen had ‘undoubtedly’ chosen a better place to study 
economics” (Rader, 1966, p. 20). He obtained his B.A. in economics at Carleton College 
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 Very rare examples of publications reflecting research in the continuation of this tradition are (Degnbol-
Martinussen, 2001) and (Yefimov, 2003).  
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under John Bates Clark in 1880, when Clark has not yet abandoned his German-born ideas. I 
suppose that Veblen’s institutional background, received from earlier Clark, got a 
philosophical support when in 1881 he undertook a graduate work at Johns Hopkins 
University under Charles Sanders Peirce ; Veblen’s notion “habit of thought” was certainly 
adopted from Peirce. Veblen’s PhD adviser at Yale University was William Graham Sumner, 
from whom apparently comes his attachments to Darwinist ideas, but certainly not his 
political views. Of course, Veblen was a keen observer of America of the end of the 19
th
, 
beginning of the 20
th
 centuries, but he never made any systematic field studies.  It was 
probably Veblen who started the widely accepted discourse concerning the absence of theory 
in the German Historical School
37: “The whole broad range of erudition and research that 
engaged the energies of that school commonly falls short of being science, in that, when 
consistent, they have contented themselves with an enumeration of data and a narrative 
account of industrial development, and have not presumed to offer a theory of anything or to 
elaborate their results into a consistent body of knowledge” (Veblen, 1990, p. 58). This 
evaluation comes from his “naïve conception of science” (Mirowski, 1987, p. 1023), which is 
purely modernist: “Science creates nothing but theories. It knows nothing of policy or utility, 
or better or worse. None of all that is comprised in what is to-day accounted scientific 
knowledge. Wisdom and proficiency of the pragmatic sort does not contribute to the advance 
of a knowledge of fact. It has only an incidental bearing on scientific research, and its bearing 
is chiefly that of inhibition and misdirection” (Veblen, 1990, p. 19).   
 Ronald Coase wrote in his autobiography that the decisive in his career of economist 
was his attendance of the course of Arnold Plant at the London School of Economics in 1930: 
“<…> that was to change my view of the working of the economic system, or perhaps more 
accurately was to give me one. What Plant did was to introduce me to Adam Smith's 
"invisible hand". He made me aware of how a competitive economic system could be 
coordinated by the pricing system”. He planned to continue his studies in the university in 
order to become a lawyer, but, as a result of Plant's influence, the University of London 
awarded him a travelling scholarship and he spent the academic year 1931-32 in the United 
States “studying the structure of American industries, with the aim of discovering why 
industries were organized in different ways”. He “carried out this project mainly by visiting 
factories and businesses”. As we can judge he saw these factories and businesses through the 
spectacles of the "invisible hand". At the end of his visit to the United States he formulated 
ideas that became the basis for his article "The Nature of the Firm", published in 1937, cited 
by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences in awarding him the 1991 Alfred Nobel 
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. Coase was awarded this prize for his discovery of "the 
significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and 
functioning of the economy". As I know, during more than thirty years nobody paid attention 
to this article until it has been “discovered” by Oliver Williamson. The notion of transaction 
costs suit quite well with the phenomena of vertical integration, but according to the 
modernist tradition and institution of economics adapted to it, it became a universal concept 
applied to everything. In this way an extraordinary rise of the Rational Choice Institutionalism 
has been lunched, and the domain has received the name of “New Institutional Economics”. 
The manual (Furubotn and Richter, 1998) and the handbook (Ménard and Shirley, 2005) of 
New Institutional Economics underline its close link and mutual complementarities with 
neoclassical economics. Following the methodology of J.S. Mill, New Institutional 
Economics is an “abstract science”. Douglas North noticed: “There is a lack of empirical 
work on the subject (…) When Lee Alston, Thrain Eggertsson and I were working on a book 
of reading on empirical studies in new institutional economics, we had difficulty finding a 
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sufficient number of case studies to use. The reason is that few have been done.” (North, 
2000, pp. 8, 9) Erik Furubotn and Rudolph Richter consider New Institutional Economics as 
an amalgamation of the theory of transaction costs, economic theory of property rights, and 
theory of contracts. These authors quoted the opinion of Ronald Coase concerning the 
distinguishing feature of economists working in this domain. According to him, it is the 
application of standard economics for analysing institutions and discovering what role they 
play in economic performance (Furubotn and Richter, 1998, p. 436). However Furubotn and 
Richter notice that not all members of the new institutional economics community share this 
opinion, and debates on whether it is necessary to go to a different paradigm, or not, are not 
finished (Ibid., 1998, pp. 437 - 438). Among those who disagree with Coase’ definition is 
Douglass C. North.  
Professional story of North can be divided in two parts: before 1993 and after. After   
awarding him the 1993 Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, he radically 
changed the discourse in his writings. He has made a new turn in New Institutional 
Economics which separated him from the rest of the community. His new writings are in 
sharp contradiction with his previous ones. Before 1993, as economic historian, he tried to 
explain economic history using neoclassical economics supplemented by three theories 
mentioned above making together the New Institutional Economics
38
. But in 1994 he 
published together with Arthur Debzau the article “Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and 
Institutions” where the vision of social reality has nothing in common with neoclassical 
economics. This vision was further developed nine years later in his book Understanding the 
Process of Economic Change (North, 2005). The title of the book is very revealing; his 
understanding  is very close to Weberian Verstehen. In this book, North, without making any 
references to Schmoller and Commons, has returned to their theoretical views.  At the very 
beginning of the book he declares: “The economic paradigm – neo-classical theory – was not 
created to explain the process of economic change. We live in an uncertain and ever changing 
world that is continually evolving in new and novel ways. Standard theories are of little help 
in this context. Attempting to understand economic, political, and social change (and one 
cannot grasp change in only one without the others) requires a fundamental recasting of the 
way we think. Can we develop a dynamic theory of change comparable in elegance to general 
equilibrium theory? The answer is probably not. But we can achieve an understanding of the 
underlying process of change then we can develop somewhat more limited hypotheses about 
change that can enormously improve the usefulness of social science theory in confronting 
human problems” (Ibid., p. vii). Thus, instead of elegant theories he proposes to achieve an 
understanding, which helps to develop hypotheses useful for solution of human problems. In 
this way the elegance of theory is sacrificed in favour of the usefulness. What was a 
stumbling-block in the dispute between Menger and Schmoller, namely laws
39
 and 
determinism, even in its probabilistic/stochastic form (ergodic world), are rejected by North 
with the same resoluteness as by Schmoller. He criticises Samuelson for whom “the ergodic 
hypotheses was essential for a scientific economics”.  He disagrees with Solow, who wrote 
that “the best and the brightest in the profession proceed as if economics is the physics of 
society” and that “there is a single universally valid model of the world”, “it only needs to be 
applied”. North concludes that “to an economic historian surveying the ten millennia of 
human history from onset of the Neolithic revolution, however, the ergotic hypothesis is a-
historical”. (Ibid., p. 19). As German historical economists more than hundred years earlier, 
North comes to the conclusion that our theories have to be inevitably contextual in time and 
space (Ibid., p. 20 – 21).  
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 A comparison of Schmoller’s and North’s methodological and theoretical positions is given in (Peukert, 2001).  
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 See (Menger, 1883), especially the Appendix V.  
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What happened? How to explain such a radical change in North’s methodological and 
theoretical views? Let me tell you a story which perhaps could help to answer this question. 
Several years ago I participated in a seminar on New Institutional Economics. Most of the 
participants were young economists from different European countries. One day I assisted a 
session where a former very close North’s collaborator was present. He shared with young 
colleagues the advice he received from North on how to succeed his professional career. 
According to him, North advised to start the career of academic economist with articles 
treating small topics in the framework of the accepted approach. “Gradually, he continued, 
during your career you can increase the scale of your topics and slightly deviate from the 
accepted approach. After achieving some authority you can write not only articles but also 
books”. The former North’s assistant concluded that according to North, you can begin to 
write what ever you want only after being awarded an Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in 
Economic Sciences. The former North’s collaborator very often used in his speech the word 
“sell”. After he finished his advice, I addressed to young economists and said that in my 
opinion we, economists, are not sellers, and that our profession is closer to that of a priest than 
that of a merchant. After the end of the session, he told me: “Vladimir, you are Russian, you 
probably follow Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, but I have to feed my children”. I said nothing but 
thought: “In this case it would be better for you to choose another profession”.  
That makes now many decades that economics of Schmoller and Commons are not 
practiced at any significant way. It is ironic that these currents of economics are often unfairly 
accused now as partisan/normative when practically all contemporary currents of economic 
thought, either orthodox or heterodox, are becoming more and more normative. It is their 
dominant a priori method, that orients them in this direction. There exists among economists a 
great confusion, whether they study what is, or they construct what ought to be. In most cases 
the economists are dealing with “what ought to be” without very much care to know in detail 
and understand “what is”. It is really a very important characteristic of the contemporary 
institution of economics. The absolute majority of economists and many social scientists, 
thinking that they are practitioners of science, which was started on an institutional basis by 
the Royal Society of London, are at the most prescience political/social/moral philosophers. 
They do not investigate in detail the reality but elaborate some social projects. To confuse 
these two activities and call philosophy science is very dangerous, because it makes 
impossible for economics to achieve similar practical results significant for the humanity as 
natural sciences did. An illustration of this confusion can be the manifesto: “Towards an 
institutionalist political economy” recently issued by three French scholars40. A French 
version of this manifesto was published in the issue number 30 (2007) of the half-yearly 
edition of La Revue du MAUSS, with the title “Towards another economic science (and thus 
another world)?”. The normative disease of economists is just felt in the title of this issue of 
La Revue. Let’s make an experiment; let’s change the word “economic” in this title by the 
words “physical”, “chemical”, or “biological”. As a result of this experiment we get a very 
strange statement: another type of physics (chemistry, biology) will give us another type of 
world in which we live, that is physical properties of materials will become different, 
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 At the beginning of the manifest the relation economics vs. political economy is characterised in the following 
way: “Historically, economic analysis has been practiced in two definitive traditions: within its political context, 
as political economy and without, as economics or economic science. We believe that the first must be 
recognized as having principled superiority over the second. That is, we consider economic science, not as a 
mechanical or mathematical science (even though mathematics certainly has a critical role to play), but as linked 
tightly to general social science and to political and moral philosophy. In this sense, political economy forms a 
branch of political philosophy, and political philosophy, the context for each of the social sciences. Economics 
(or economic science) is thus correctly interpreted only as the analytical moment of political economy.” 
Revue du MAUSS permanente, 9 September 2008,  http://www.journaldumauss.net/spip.php?article232  
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chemical reactions will proceed differently, and biological qualities of organisms will be 
transformed. You agree that is nonsense. However, the author of the manifesto, and articles 
published in this issue of La Revue, meant something different. In his introductory article for 
this issue, the author of the manifesto, Alain Caillé, indicates that economics “became the true 
revealed religion, the authentic substitute and heir of Christianism (with which however  it 
undertakes narrow historical, cultural, metaphysical and psychological links)” (Caillé 2007, 
p. 6). It is absolutely true that “the modern world is to a great extent a realisation of the dream 
(“the dream comes true”), prophecy and preaching of the economic science” (Ibid., p. 7)41. 
The above pages of my paper are in total accordance with this judgement, but I insist to say 
that this economics is not a science but the theology of a secular religion which indeed has 
conquered the world. The world looks more and more like the realisation of this prophecy 
because a larger and larger number of people became believers of this religion, and thus 
perceive their human environment and act according to these beliefs. It is of course necessary 
to struggle against this religion and one of the ways to do it is to elaborate and propagate 
alternative beliefs. However, it is not the task of economic scientists/ researchers/investigators 
of socio-economic-political reality, but the task of political/social/moral philosophers. New 
generation of scholars from the French regulation school understand it very well: “political 
economy is not a moral science”42 (Amable et Palombarini, 2005). The task of researchers is 
to investigate and try to understand “what is”. The task of politicians, taking into 
consideration what they learned from scientists on “what is”, and what they learned from 
philosophers on “what ought to be”, is to make their choice. It is their responsibility, and it is 
mutually harmful if politicians delegate this responsibility to scholars-researchers. It 
devaluates politicians and move efforts of researchers away from what they really could and 
should do. The researchers can assist politicians in generating of alternatives, “what ought to 
be”, but should not substitute them in the operation of choice (Ibid., pp. 270 – 271).   
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 This is the continuation of the sentence with a passionate accusation of this religion: « Jusqu’au cauchemar 
parfois. Et cela devient chaque jour plus vrai, à l’échelle de la planète, où plus rien d’autre ne semble doté de la 
réalité que l’enrichissement personnel et matériel. Face à elles, tout – toute valeur, toute croyance, toute action 
menée pour elle-même, pour le plaisir, toute existence qui n’est pas voué à la recherche de l’utilité – tout semble 
illusoire, inopérant, n’en valant pas la peine, superflu, irréel » (Ibid.). It could not be said better and I do not dare 
to translate it into English.   
42
 It would be better to say: political economy should not be a political/social/moral philosophy.  
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7. Methodenstreit reconsidered  
 
If social scientists wanted to become objective, 
they would have to find the very rare, costly, 
local, miraculous, situation where they can 
render their subject of study as much as 
possible able to object to what is said about 
them, to be as disobedient as possible to the 
protocol, and to be as capable to raise their 
own questions in their own terms and not in 
those of the scientists whose interests they do 
not have to share! Then, humans would start to 
behave in the hands of social scientists as 
interestingly as natural objects in the hands of 
natural scientists. 
                 (Bruno Latour, 2000, p. 115)  
 
 Dispute of methods, or Methodenstreit
43
, between Gustave Schmoller and Carl 
Menger can be considered as a repetition of a similar dispute taking place more than two 
hundred years earlier between Robert Boyle and Thomas Hobbes. Schmoller-Menger dispute 
started soon after the beginning of the institutionalisation of experimentally oriented 
economics which happened with the creation in 1873 of the Verein für Sozialpolitik. Boyle-
Hobbes dispute
44
 started in 1660, when the Royal Society of London had been founded, the 
cradle of the institution of science. The activities of both societies were similar in several 
respects: they represented efforts to collect data in the framework of experimental situations, 
working out of detailed reports and collective evaluation of obtained results. The reports of 
the Royal Society served to enlarge the number of witnesses of experiments and in this way 
“to make virtual witnessing a practical option for the validation of experimental 
performances” “(Shapin and Schaffer, 1985, p. 69). Boyle insisted on his “lack of 
preconceived expectations, and, especially, of theoretical investments in the outcome of 
experiments (Ibid., p. 68). Now, it is almost forgotten that Hobbes was not only a political 
philosopher but also a physicist (natural philosopher). He criticised the experimental way of 
producing physical knowledge and he insisted on rationalist methods, as Menger also did, of 
obtaining knowledge. Both of them proceeded from definitions through deduction to 
consequences. For Hobbes, as for Menger, the model of “science” was geometry, which 
“yielded irrefutable and incontestable knowledge” (Ibid., p. 100). On the contrary, the “the 
Royal Society advertises itself as a ‘union of eyes and hands’” (Ibid., p. 78). Hobbes thought 
that “the factual knowledge, it was true, had a valuable role to play in constituting our overall 
knowledge, but it was not of the sort to secure certainty and universal assent” (Ibid., p. 102).  
Boyle did win the dispute, Schmoller did loose. In my opinion it happened for the following 
main reasons. The motto Nullius in Verba (demonstration by facts and not by words) has 
become the rule at the basis of the institution of natural sciences, the most important feature of 
the scientific culture. From the very beginning activity of researchers according to this rule 
did not contradict interests of powerful groups of the society, and later such groups were even 
very much interested in the existence of this rule because of profitable practical results. It did 
not occur in economics just because of the strong resistance of such groups to experimental 
social research. They saw much more danger than benefit for them in this type of research. On 
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 The dispute began with the publication by Schmoller of a negative evaluation in his article « Zur 
Methodologie der Staats- und Sozial-Wissenschaften » of the Menger’s book (1883).    
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 The book (Shapin and Schaffer, 1985) is devoted to the analysis of this dispute. 
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the contrary they were interested in abstract theoretical constructions justifying laissez-faire. 
This kind of constructions corresponded to deeply enrooted scholastic traditions of European 
universities to teach theology and linked with it philosophy. In the framework of these 
traditions the mathematics was considered as a summit of scientific approach. Powerful 
groups of society supported these traditions in the economics profession and made all possible 
to suppress newly born experimental current of economics. Modernist type of discourse 
concerning science allowed to legitimate scholastic approach used by economists as scientific 
one. Can you imagine, in what world, from the point of view of technology, we would live 
now if Hobbes’ concept of science had overcome? The humanity remained at the 
technological level of the 17
th
 century. Now imagine the world’s history of the 20th century if 
the Schmoller’s concept of economics would have overcome. I think that, in this case many 
human catastrophes could have been avoided.  
Today, the dispute between Menger and Schmoller can be seen as a dispute between 
modernist and pragmatist/constructivist paradigms (see the Table 2 below)..  
 
 Modernist paradigm Pragmatist/constructivist paradigm 
Basic assumptions The world is external and 
objective 
 
The observer is independent 
 
Science is value free 
The world is socially constructed 
and subjective 
The observer is an integral part of 
what is observed 
Science is moved by human 
interests 
Basic 
characteristics of 
research  
Data presents objective facts 
Context is given a priori 
Sublimation of complexity 
Logic of verification 
Data presents subjective meanings 
Context is apprehended a posteriori 
Taking into account of complexity 
Logic of discovery 
The researcher 
must: 
Elaborate concepts in such a way 
that they could be measured   
Find causality links and 
fundamental laws  
Reduce the phenomena to their 
simplest elements  
Formulate hypotheses and test 
them 
Elaborate concepts rooted in 
qualitative and quantitative data 
Try to understand the phenomenon 
under study 
Observe every situation in its 
totality 
Develop ideas by abduction from 
data 
Source : (Usunier, Easterby-Smith and Thore, 2000, p. 37) and (Mucchielli, 1996, p. 197)  adapted by the author. 
 
Table 2.  Basic characteristics of modernist and pragmatist/constructivist paradigms  
 
Let me comment just one line in this table which is dealing with complexity.  One of the 
modernist thinkers, the founder of positivism, Auguste Comte, professed to simplify observed 
phenomena before explaining them. Social sciences and in particular economics followed this 
positivist tradition. The scholars reduced phenomena under study to a certain number of 
quantitative variables or made a synthetic description before starting an analysis. In this way 
the positivist approach in general and the quantitative approach in particular sublime or deny 
the complexity of the phenomena under study. On the contrary the pragmatist/constructivist 
approach in social sciences, associated with qualitative research, does not reject the 
complexity but tries to manage it in the research process. This approach foresees rich and 
thick descriptions in order not to lose some crucial information.  These descriptions often take 
the form of quotations from interviews. Descriptions incorporated in an article, or a book, do 
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not represent raw data but are chosen as significant. They are ranged according to constructed 
categories and accompanied by comments. In this way they represent an important part of the 
reasoning and allow the readers to make their own judgements concerning results of the 
research. 
Experimentalist type of economics was dead
45
 but, some schools in sociology and 
anthropology resisted to the modernist methodology and followed in some way 
methodological tradition of German economics. Among them the Chicago sociological 
school
46
 of Symbolic Interactionism. A prominent representative of this school wrote: “No 
theorizing, however ingenious, and no observance of scientific protocol, however meticulous, 
are substitutes for developing a familiarity with what is actually going on in the sphere of life 
under study” (Blumer, 1969, p.39);  “We must say in all honesty that the research scholar in 
the social sciences who undertakes to study a given sphere of social life that he does not know 
at first hand will fashion a picture of that sphere in terms of pre-established images <…> [In 
the framework of usual research practices] in place of being tested and modified by firsthand 
acquaintance with the sphere of life they [pre-established images] become a substitute for 
such acquaintance. <…> There is no demand on the research scholar to do a lot of free 
exploration in the area, getting close to the people involved in it, seeing it in a variety of 
situations they meet, noting their problems and observing how they handle them, being party 
of their conversations, and watching their life as it flows along. In place of such exploration 
and flexible pursuit of intimate contact with what is going on, reliance is put on starting with a 
theory or model, posing a problem in terms of the model, setting a hypothesis with regard to 
the problem, outlining a mode of inquiry to test that hypotheses, using standardized 
instruments to get precise data, and so forth” (Blumer, 1969, pp. 36 - 37) The last sentence of 
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This statement can sound strange taking into consideration the existence of Experimental Economics 
of Vernon Smith. This branch of mainstream economics is in my opinion a parody of experimental approach. 
Most of so called experimental economics laboratory experiments are carried out with students (undergraduate 
and MBA) on the basis of economic equilibrium, game theory, and utility theory schemes. In addition 
constructed experimental situation contains a priori rules, which neoclassical authors misleadingly called 
institutions. These experiments follow the logic of theory/hypothesis verification in the framework of modernist 
paradigm. Logic of verification of this kind of experiments requires that “structure of the experimental design 
should be planned with consideration for the subsequent statistical analysis of the hypotheses of interest” (Davis 
and Holt, 1993, pp. 30, 31). Advocates of neoclassical experimental economics see that advantages offered by 
laboratory methods are generation of data and control: “Distinguishing natural data may sometimes exist in 
principle, but the data are either not collected or collected too imprecisely to distinguish among alternative 
theories. In other instances, relevant data cannot be collected, because it is simply impossible to find economic 
situations that match the assumptions of the theory (sic!). An absence of control in natural contexts presents 
critical data problems in many areas of economic research” (Ibid., p.15). If it is “impossible to find situations 
that match the assumptions of the theory” why should these data be collected? An absence of control in natural 
contexts does not present critical data problems if the objective of the research is not to predict or to verify but to 
understand with the help of people acting in these contexts. The Experimental Economics of Vernon Smith deals 
with a different kind of people. In order to guarantee an “unbiaseness” of participants’ behaviour, the 
experimenters make a lot of efforts to prevent participants from discovering objectives of the experiment.  
 The methodology of pragmatist/constructivist laboratory gaming simulation experiments is the opposite. 
Most of the data generated by these experiments are not quantitative but qualitative. The experimental situation 
as the whole experimental design is based on this kind of experiments not exclusively on abstractions, but 
primarily on results of preliminary field studies. The players-participants execute roles and make research. In an 
experiment so designed, the players-participants are directly interested in studying the functioning of the 
analysed institutions. The emphasis on the aim to win may disturb the necessary level of dual behaviour and thus 
devaluate the experiment (Yefimov, 1979, pp. 404 – 409). The method of gaming-simulation gives possibility to 
organise laboratory economic experiments as a research process which follows the pragmatist/constructivist 
logic of theory/hypothesis discovery/construction. The research process is organised in this kind of laboratory 
experiments on the basis of a dialogue between scholars (experimenters) and players-participants (experienced 
actors in the area of real life under study), as a special form of  “brainstorming session” accompanied by a 
computer simulation model managed by the players-participants (Yefimov, 1981, p. 198).   
46
 One of the famous works of this school (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1926) was based on the life history method. 
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this quotation describes exactly in what way most of the economists do empirical research. It 
was expressed in an explicit form by Milton Friedman (1953): “A theory is the way we 
perceive ‘facts’, and we cannot perceive ‘facts’ without a theory” (p. 34). This idea is shared 
by an absolute majority of economists and they are not even ready to discuss this idea because 
it seems to them so obvious. The idea legitimates the work of the army of academics involved 
in creating and improving economic abstract a priori theoretical constructions because 
following this idea no economic analysis is possible without them.  
To my mind this idea is totally erroneous and looks obvious because it identifies any 
preanalytic cognitive act with theory. Josef Schumpeter proposed the term Vision to signify 
this act: “ <…> in order to be able to posit to our selves any problems at all, we should first 
have to visualise a distinct set of coherent phenomena as a worth-while object of our analytic 
efforts” (1954, p. 41). He illustrates his notion of vision by the example taken from Keynes’s 
General theory of Employment, Interest and Money. He indicated that “in order to give 
convenient expression to certain facts of ‘the world in which we live’ – although, as Keynes 
himself emphasised, these facts are attributed to his fundamental schedules (propensity to 
consume, attitude to liquidity, and marginal efficiency of capital) <…> there can be no 
question of their having been established by antecedent factual research” (Ibid., pp. 41 – 42). 
Keyes underlined that they are “plausibly ascribed to our [the English] world, to our general 
knowledge of contemporary human nature” (Keynes, 1936, p. 250). The example shows that 
by Vision, Schumpeter means some set of a priori concepts on the bases of which an analysis 
is made. Robert Heilbroner understood very well the “theological” nature of mainstream 
economics (1988, 2004) and transformed the Schumpeter’s notion of vision in the following 
way:  “By vision we mean the political hopes and fears, social stereotypes, and value 
judgements <…> that infuse all social thought” (Heilbroner and Milberg, 1995, p. 4).  The 
authors appeal mainstream economists to change their present laissez-faire vision in favour of 
“a recognition of the necessity for the widening degree and deepening penetration of public 
guidance into the working of capitalism itself” (Ibid., p. 119).  I do not believe that economics 
should remain “theological” and that is why I cannot accept Heilbroner’s deviation of 
Schumpeter’s notion of vision. I propose to extend the Schumpeter’s notion of vision to 
include in it not only a set of a priori concepts, but also types of techniques of study on the 
basis of these concepts, and also forms of presentation of the research results. In other words, 
the Vision determines first, what to study, secondly, how to study, and the thirdly, under what 
form the results of study should be presented. For the interpretive institutional economics 
which follows Schmoller-Commons’s tradition the vision can be formulated as follows: it 
studies institutions (formal and informal rules) and beliefs linked with these institutions; it 
uses in the study qualitative research techniques (Denzen and Lincoln, 2005), which include 
among others, Action Research (Reason and Bradbury, 2001) and Grounded Theory (Bryant 
and Charmaz, 2007); and, it presents results of the study in the form of thick descriptions 
(Geertz, 1973). I will discuss below in this section of the paper in more detail the first and the 
second elements of the vision of interpretive institutional economics, but before I will 
characterise briefly the third one.  
Clifford Geertz is the founder of interpretive social anthropology. According to him 
anthropologist should not to discover “laws” but try to understand meanings of actors. In this 
idea he follows Max Weber, who indicated “that man is an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun” (Ibid., р. 5).  As Latour and Knorr Cetina, Geertz thinks that 
“if you want to understand what a science is, you should look in the first instance not at its 
theories or its findings, and certainly not at what its apologists say about it ; you should look 
at what the practitioners of it do” (Ibid.). Finally what social anthropologists do it is “thick 
descriptions” (Ibid., р. 5, 6). Their activity can be compared with reading a “manuscript –
foreign, faded, full of ellipses, incoherencies, suspicious emendations, and tendentious 
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commentaries, but written not in conventionalized graphs of sound but in transient examples 
of shaped behaviour”. (Ibid., р. 10). “Thick description” is a translation of such a manuscript 
into understandable to us language.  
Let us discuss the first element of the vision; what to study. Unfortunately not only 
neoclassical economists share Friedman’s opinion that “we cannot perceive ‘facts’ without a 
theory”. It happens because they often use the term ”theory” instead of the notion “vision”. 
Geoffrey Hodgson who is one of the very active writers with ‘institutionalist label’ confessed: 
“Contrary to many institutionalist writers, the epistemological position here is strongly anti-
empiricist”47 (Hodgson, 1988, p. 24). He criticised Friedman not for his modernist positivism 
but on the basis of this ‘strongly anti-empiricist’ position (Ibid., pp. 28 - 35). Let us discuss 
his ‘anti-empiricists’ arguments, which are indeed pro-Cartesian arguments: “The key 
criticism of empiricist epistemology (…) is that no observation can be independent of the 
conceptual framework, language and theoretical system of the observer. Consequently, no 
‘objective’ facts can be known untainted by the preconceptions of the investigator” (Ibid., 
p. 35). I believe that the Hodgson’s mistake is to consider “conceptual framework, language 
and theoretical system of the observer” almost as synonyms. Interpretive institutionalist 
investigator before engaging in a field study has his conceptual framework: she/he studies 
institutions (formal and informal rules) and beliefs linked with these institutions. Nevertheless 
the statement “all facts are expressed in some form of language, and an aconceptual or 
atheoretical language is impossible” is a sophism because of the use of undefined here notions 
of ‘theory’ and ‘language’. ‘Theories’ and ‘languages’ in social studies can be of different 
levels. The statement is true if the notions of ‘language’ and ‘theory’ are used in the sense of 
categories shared in a certain socio-cultural linguistic environment (low level categories) 
which can be very large. For example, if the area under study was the Russian countryside, 
then knowledge of Russian language including technical agricultural terms would be 
sufficient to begin ‘observation’, i.e. “getting close to the people involved in it, seeing it in a 
variety of situations they meet, noting their problems and observing how they handle them, 
being party of their conversations, and watching their life as it flows along”.  
At the same time the statement of Hodgson is false if the notions of ‘language’ and 
‘theory’ are used in the sense of categories and models/theories/hypotheses shared by a 
certain community of scholars. For example, gathering data concerning preconceived 
quantitative variables used in a theory and escaping any other information, which could be 
collected in the field if it does not enter in this set of preconceived variables, will make 
investigator ‘blind’ to many possible insights. In the case of using low level categories shared 
by actors of the area under study the scholar has a possibility to make a discovery and to 
reconsider his pre-established image of the area under study by developing his own new 
categories. In the case of using high level categories shared by members of a certain scientific 
community, a scholar, member of this community, is certainly dependant of the conceptual 
framework of the community. The potential validity of the institutinalist conceptual 
framework is based on the belief that social regularities come from socially shared rules and 
beliefs. But this conceptual framework is not a model or theory as it is understood in 
economics. On the contrary, in case of the use of an a priori model or theory, the scholar is 
unable to discover in the field something outside of her/his a priori model/theory/hypothesis 
and what she/he can do only is to ‘test’ this a priori model/theory/hypothesis. Geoffrey 
Hodgson is right by saying that “we cannot ever gain a more accurate or adequate 
understanding of economic reality exclusively by observation and the gathering of data” 
because understanding of economic reality can progress only through ‘representational 
redescription’, i.e. the correction or even total change of categories/concepts/theories 
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 According to Hodgson, empiricism “boils down to the view that sense data, or ‘experience’, are the ultimate 
source of all knowledge” (Ibid., p. 35). It is a typically modernist statement.  
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constructed on the basis or emerged from observation and gathering of data. I agree with 
professor Hodgson when, following the sociology of science, he said that “science is a social 
activity and its development involves the social generation, scrutinization and acceptance or 
rejection of theories, procedures and norms. Consequently, science can never be ‘neutral’ in 
the sense that it is entirely free of the biases and preoccupations of society and the scientific 
community” (Ibid., p.36).  
Probably the confusion between “theory” and “language” comes from the practice of 
experimental physics. According to Prigogine and Stengers natural scientists have some kind 
of experimental dialogue with Nature.  This dialogue “corresponds to a highly specific 
procedure. Nature is cross-examined through experimentation, as if in a court of law, in the 
name of a priori principles, Nature’s answers are recorded with utmost accuracy, but 
relevance of those answers is assessed in terms of the very idealizations that guided the 
experiments. All the rest does not count as information, but is idle chatter, negligible 
secondary effects” (Prigogine and Stengers, 1985, p. 42). It means that this dialogue is going 
on using the language of a theory which “guides the experiment” (Ibid., p. 49). However 
unlike the Nature which can communicate with human being researcher only in language of 
researchers’ theories, the actors, active objects of socio-politico-economic research, are also 
human being, who can communicate with researchers not in language of researchers’ theories 
but in English, French or Russian which can be understood by both sides. It means that 
economists who transfer the practice of dialogue with Nature in natural sciences to practice of 
dialogue with Human beings commit a mistake. What Prigogine and Stengers are saying that 
quite often investigators of nature are forced to design their experiments as testing of some 
theories. Some methodologists of economics understand potential dangers of this kind of 
testing: “The first step in testing a scientific theory was to deduce certain empirical 
predictions from the theory and its initial conditions. The second step was to check these 
predictions against the observational evidence; if the empirical predictions turned out to be 
true, the theory was confirmed, and if these predictions turned out to be false, the theory was 
disconfirmed. In either case, it was not induction, but rather the deductive consequences of a 
scientific theory, that were relevant to its empirical support <…> Hypothetico-deductive 
method allowed scientific theories to be ‘based on’ empirical observations (deductively) 
without actually being ‘built up from’ those observations (inductively).”  (Davis, Hands and 
Maki, 1998 p. 376) In this way the realism of research depends of a priori guessing of realistic 
theory. In case of simple systems, which were studied in classical physics, such guessing was 
possible. For more complex system such guessing becomes very improbable. Systems studied 
by economic science are never simple and that is why a priori theories do not have any chance 
to serve a basis for understanding of economic phenomena. No testing of this kind of theories 
would help:  “Cut off from observation as a source of truth, the Cartesian mind puts great on 
‘testing’ to reaffirm its realism. But testing is not a guarantee of correct ideas because, having 
lost its mooring in reality, the economic mind has created so many conundrums, puzzles and 
purely mental constructs that testing proves everything and nothing.” (Mini, 1994, p. 41)  
The described above elements (the first and the third) of the vision of interpretive 
institutional economics are in many respects shared by late Douglass North. If the New 
German Historical School and Wisconsin Institutionalism were inspired by philosophical 
constructions of hermeneutics and pragmatism, North turned to cognitive science. At the end 
of the 20
th
 century the latter conquered some positions of epistemology
48
.  The following 
quotation from the North’s book (2005) contains its main idea: “Economic change is for the 
most part a deliberate process shaped by the perceptions of the actors about the consequences 
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refers to efforts to ground the theory of knowledge in an understanding of how the brain works” (Edelman, 
2006).  
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of their actions. The perceptions come from the beliefs of the players – beliefs that typically 
blended with their preferences < …> Understanding is a necessary prerequisite missing in the 
economists’s rush to model economic growth and change. We are a long way from 
completely understanding the process” (North, 2005, p. viii, ix). North even approached to the 
Geertz’notion of thick descriptions: “It is one thing to be able to provide a summary 
description of the process of economic change; it is something else to provide sufficient 
content to this description to give us an understanding of this process” (Ibid., p. 4). 
Let us come now to the second element of the institutionalist vision: how to study. The 
interpretive institutional economics, the heir of Schmoller-Commons’s economics, study 
socio-politico-economic reality on the basis of qualitative research. Qualitative research can 
analyse data at several levels: “At the most basic level, data are organized chronologically or 
sometimes topically and presented in a narrative that is largely, if not wholly, descriptive
49
.  
Moving from concrete description of observable data to a somewhat more abstract level 
involves using concepts to describe phenomena <…> This is the process of systematically 
classifying data into some sort of schema consisting of categories, themes or types. The 
categories describe the data, but to some extent they also interpret the data. A third level of 
analysis involves making inferences, developing models, or generating theory.” (Merriam, 
2001, p. 187) Some categories can be of similarity-based type when the others are of 
explanation-based type. The process of qualitative research can be characterised as a 
progressive move from actors’ meaning to researcher’s meaning (sense).  
 
 
Points of 
comparison  Quantitative Research Qualitative Research 
Philosophical 
roots 
Cartesianism, positivism 
  
Pragmatism, hermeneutics  
 
Goal of 
investigation 
Prediction, confirmation, 
hypothesis testing 
Understanding, description, discovery, 
meaning, hypothesis generation 
Design  Predetermined, structured Flexible, evolving, emergent 
Sample Large, random, representative  Small, non-random, purposeful 
Data collection Inanimate instruments (statistical 
data, surveys, questionnaires) 
Researcher as primary instrument, semi-
directive interviews, observations, 
documents  
Mode of 
analyses 
Deductive and inductive (by 
statistical method) 
Abductive (by researcher) 
Findings Precise, numerical Comprehensive, holistic, expansive, richly 
descriptive 
Source: (Merriam, 2001, p.9) adapted by the author. 
 
Table 3. Characteristics of quantitative and qualitative research  
 
The Table 3 above presents a comparison of characteristics of qualitative research with 
the quantitative approach. The dichotomy indicated in this table does not exclude the use of 
quantitative methods in the framework of a qualitative research. The most important 
characteristics of qualitative research are the following (Ibid., pp. 6-8, 61): 
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from studying the phenomenon. While description is an important component of all forms of qualitative 
research, few studies are limited to this level of analysis.” (Ibid., pp. 178-179). 
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1) Qualitative researchers are interested in understanding the meanings people have 
constructed, that is, how they make sense of their world and the experiences they have 
in the world. It is assumed that meaning is embedded in people’s experiences and that 
the meaning is mediated through the investigator’s own perceptions. The key concern 
is understanding the phenomenon of interest from the participants’ perspectives, not 
the researcher’s. 
2) Qualitative researcher uses his data not to answer questions like how much or how 
often but to discover what occurs, the implications of what occurs, and the 
relationships linking occurrences. In this case his sample has not to be large and 
random but has to correspond to this purpose. Purposeful sampling serves to the 
investigator to discover, understand, and gain insight and therefore he must select a 
sample from which the most can be learned.  The size of the sample can be determined 
gradually: sampling continues until a point of saturation is reached, i.e. no new 
information is forthcoming from new sampled units.  
3) The researcher is the primary instrument for data collection and analysis. It determines 
by a creative character of communication with actors and abductive nature of data 
analysis (insights). 
4) Qualitative research usually involves fieldwork. An occasional qualitative study could 
be undertaken using documents alone, but these are exceptions. 
5) The product of a qualitative research is richly descriptive. 
Among the qualitative research techniques, the most advanced ones are Action 
Research and Grounded Theory. As I mentioned above, Commons was may be the first to use 
Action Research. Now, it quite a common experimental practice in social sciences 
(Greenwood and Levin, 1998; Stringer, 1999; Reason and Bradbury, 2001).  The main 
pioneer of action research – Kurt Lewin – associated the idea of action research with the idea 
of doing experiments in the field (Reason and Bradbury, 2001, p.17). Now action research is 
usually understood as “the whole family of approaches to inquiry which are participative, 
grounded in experience and action-oriented” (Ibid., xxiv). In action research, new knowledge 
is created through active experimentation. The results are always tested in real life because 
action research aims to find solutions to real problems. The results of its application are 
justified through their workability (Levin and Greenwood, 2001, p. 107). “Action research 
focuses on solving context-bound real-life problems. Knowledge production cannot be done 
without taking into account the wholeness of a situation. Inquiry is based on questions 
emerging from real-life situations as opposed to the conventional academic way of working 
where questions arise from within the academic community which is subdivided into 
professional fiefdoms. Reading other researchers’ work as a way of identifying new research 
questions, as a the standard practice, is partly supplanted in action research by a more direct 
process of researching what social stakeholders understand to be pressing problems <…> 
Action researchers do not believe in the idea of scientific, cosmopolitan knowledge that is 
valid everywhere, and we reject the notion that valid knowledge can be produced only by 
‘objective’ outsiders using formal methods that supposedly eliminate bias and error.” (Ibid., p. 
105, 110) Nevertheless action research carried out for different contexts allows making 
generalisations and creating theories. At the same time, knowledge of different contexts by 
action researchers could be very useful in a particular situation: “By setting the local situation 
in the context of these broader comparisons, the professional action researcher can assist the 
local group in opening up its sense of the situation and some options for the future.” (Ibid.,  
p. 99) In action research, actors (insiders) and investigators (outsiders) closely collaborate. 
Action research can be called cogenerative research. “Local participants [insiders] are enabled 
to take charge of the meaning construction process. At the same time, trained researchers 
cannot make sense of local social life without secure communication links to these 
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participants. The dynamic tension between insider and outsider knowledge is the basis for this 
cogenerative process <…> The interaction between local knowledge and expert knowledge 
through a cogenerative process is a core feature of action research. One consequence of this is 
that most accounts of action research, trying to be true to the process that constructed them, 
are rendered in narrative form.” (Greenwood and Levin, 1998, pp. 113, 123)  
Theorising in the interpretive institutional economics can be nothing else than a 
creation of sets of concepts with their interrelations coming from “a close and reasonably full 
familiarity with the area of life under study”. These concepts must be deeply rooted 
(grounded) in the data gathered about rules, beliefs, and shared meanings. Most of this data 
can be collected exclusively through direct contacts with actors. Knowledge concerning these 
realities for different countries, and even for different regions and different economic sectors 
inside the same countries, in different periods of time can hardly be presented on the basis of 
the same categories/concepts. They will inevitably be different because of the complexity, 
cultural diversity and dynamics of economic realities. Special guidelines for producing this 
kind of theories (sets of concepts with their interrelations) were called Grounded Theory 
methodology [(Glaser and Straus, 1967; Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Dey, 1999; 
Locke, 2001)]. A grounded theory represents an interpretation of an observed social 
phenomenon in the sense of interpretative sociology of Max Weber. John Commons spoke 
about theorizing in the Max Weber’s (grounded theory) sense: “[The Weber’s contribution] 
converts the whole process of theorizing from a ‘theory’, in the older sense of the logical 
consistency of reality, to the mere methodology of constructing intellectual tools to be used in 
investigation. There is no longer a question of antagonism between theory and practice, for a 
theory is a tool for investigating practice.” (1934a, p. 722). Commons underlines that the 
“search for the meaning of human activities can never be expected to yield an ‘exact’ science, 
or even an approximation to the quantitative requirements of other sciences. Yet that is not 
wanted, anyhow. What the economist wants is understanding, and he wants measurement 
only as an aid to understanding” (1934a, p.723).  
Grounded theory was defined by its elaborators as a discovery of theory from data 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p.1). Grounded theory methodology is a continuation of the 
methodology of symbolic interactionism and is the most sophisticated version of qualitative 
research.  According to this methodology, a theory must be generated not in an armchair but 
in the field. The process of data collection and the generation of a theory are not totally 
separated. The investigator collects documents and contacts actors to get data for analysis. 
She/he tries to set aside theoretical ideas during data collection and initial stages of their 
analysis. She/he does it “in order to assure that the emergence of categories will not be 
contaminated by concepts more suited to different areas” (Dey, 1999, p. 4). Categories have 
to emerge from (created on the basis of) texts of documents and transcripts of interviews. The 
categories discovered by the investigator are not just names of some pieces of data but reflect 
meanings of these pieces of data. The categories formulated by the researcher are the result of 
an abductive process of a detailed creative analysis of texts of documents and transcripts of 
interviews. This process is oriented to capturing insights. The interviews led by the 
investigator are active: interviews are based on approximate questionnaires and the 
interviewer lets speak the actor; interviewed actors are not considered by the analyst as 
passive “subjects” and the interviews can even take the form of brainstorming sessions.  
“Beyond the decisions concerning initial collection of data, further collection can not 
be planned in advance of the emerging theory” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 47).  These 
decisions are taken gradually following the process of emergence (creation) of categories. The 
founders of the grounded theory called this type of data collection Theoretical Sampling. 
“Theoretical sampling is the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the 
analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyses his data and decides what data to collect next and 
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where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges. This process of data 
collection is controlled by emerging theory” (Ibid., p. 45). Under theoretical sampling, data 
collection stops when new data does not influence the established categories, their properties 
and the links between categories. “As a study proceeded, however, ideas would become more 
focused, and the methods could correspondingly become more structured; interviews, for 
example, might resemble long conversations at the start of the study but become highly 
selective and focused on particular topics (and therefore much shorter) by its close” (Dey, 
1999, p.6). It is important to choose one or several core categories among the generated 
categories. “Through the process of integrating categories, a central theoretical framework 
could crystallize around a ‘core’ category <…> A framework would ‘solidify’ out the 
analysis and delimit the research by differentiating between core and peripheral categories 
and identify the scope and boundaries of the theory. This framework could in turn direct 
further data collection and analysis – but with a more circumscribed and focused agenda” 
(Ibid., p. 9). During the analytic process the number of categories may be reduced and the 
theory can be formulated with smaller set of higher level concepts (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, 
p.110) The generated categories are hypotheses which help to understand the phenomena 
under study. According to Commons “it is a synthesis, which helps to formulate a hypothesis, 
for it sets up the following problem: What is the meaning of the activities in their relations to 
each others? And thus suggests the kind of hypothesis needed to select the facts and weigh 
their relative importance. It is a synthesis of all the factors out of which we formulate a 
hypothesis. It differs from the theory of Menger as synthesis differs from analysis” (1934a, 
p.723).   
Direct application of the grounded theory methodology to economic realities produces 
context embedded theories. It is clear that, for this type of theories, the continuity of 
institutional research can be more methodological than substantive. But it does not mean that 
every grounded theory research is an isolated investigation from the scratch. Some important 
theoretical substantive continuity is possible in the framework of the same or close contexts. 
In the latter case the comparative analysis of several grounded theories could produce 
categories/concepts of a higher level which would form new more abstract theory embracing 
several contexts at the same time. Grounded Theory methodology is nothing else but an 
explicit application of human cognition scheme to social scientific research. Any real research 
would follow it implicitly. Its other advantage is its orientation to discovery which diminishes 
the probability not to notice an important information concerning the area under study. This 
probability diminishes also by the requirement to set aside theoretical ideas during data 
collection and initial stages of their analysis. At later stages of analysis the influence on it of 
previous theoretical ideas shared by the researcher became inevitable but these ideas are 
confronted with data not filtered by these ideas, as in normal standard practice, that allows to 
the researcher to evaluate their appropriateness. The fact that the most important sources of 
information for social research are texts depicting rules (habits) and ideologies (beliefs) 
determines the Grounded Theory methodology as the methodology of generation of categories 
on the basis of texts.  
Vision of the interpretive institutional economics presented above corresponds to the 
requirement expressed in the epigraph to this section. Advocates of pragmatist/constructivist 
paradigm in social sciences see their professional practices in a similar way. President of the 
International Sociological Association, Michel Wieviorka, formulated how to fulfil the 
requirements expressed in this epigraph in the very precise way. I his address to participants 
of the Third Russian Sociological Congress
50
 in 2008, he formulated and answered two 
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questions: 1) what is usefulness of sociology? 2) what allows to say that sociology is a 
science? According to Wieviorka, these two questions are closely related. He said that a 
sociologist can be useful if he is involved in politics. Many prominent sociologists serve as 
advisers to different governments. He noted that in France a good sociologist plays the role of 
intellectual, i.e. he takes an interest in social life, participates in politics, publish articles in 
newspapers, and gives talk on the TV and radio.  On the contrary a good American sociologist 
does not go on the air, does not broadcast on the TV, and does not write for newspapers. He is 
professional, activity of which is evaluated exclusively by his colleagues and who lives 
exclusively in academic world. Wieviorka thinks that the division between sociologist-
intellectual and sociologist-professional should be overcome. By his opinion, the sociologist 
should be politically engaged. He has to study the social life in order to influence positively 
its change. Wieviorka thinks that the fact that sociologists very often play the role of experts, 
i.e. they provide purely technical information to those who needs it, is negative. If sociologists 
want really to be considered as producers of scientific knowledge they have to separate 
themselves very clearly from experts and expertise. What can be considered as a proof that 
sociologists have really grasped what they studied? A biologist can say that she/he repeated 
10 times an experiment and got the same result, but this option is unavailable to sociologists. 
Usually it is colleagues who recognise that a sociological result is right. Wieviorka said that it 
is not sufficient. Validation of knowledge has to be made also outside of scientific 
community. It allows checking whether the knowledge produced by sociologists is really 
scientific. Several options of this validation are possible. Among them are presentation of the 
research results by radio/TV broadcasting or in newspapers which permits to get comments 
and judgements of a large public; “return” for evaluation of the results of investigation to 
those who were studied;  interaction with such audience which asks questions, discuss, doubts 
and in this way participates in the improvement of the results. Michel Wieviorka thinks that 
these types of validation can be good additions to action research practices and so called 
sociological intervention when actors participate in the research process. He proposes to 
connect in this way the sociology and society. Please note that Wieviorka proposes all these 
contacts of researcher with different types of public to share with them results of research 
findings, that is her/his understanding “what is”, and not some kind of social projects, that is 
“what ought to be”. In the latter case she/he would cease to be a researcher and would become 
a social philosopher. Unlike experts that provide only technical information requested by 
those in power, politically engaged researchers communicate their findings to the public 
whether those in power like the results of these findings or not. I think it would be possible in 
a similar way to link economists and economics with society.  
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